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Abstract
In empirical literature, it is hypothesized that the persistence of Business Groups (BGs) is
linked to the capability of easing the financing constraints of participating firms through the
implementation of an internal capital market (ICM). ICMs enable capital relocation, thus par-
tially offsetting disparities in accessing bank credit. I offer three contributions. First, I formally
ground this idea with a dynamic model in which an ICM is endogenously generated as a func-
tion of the bank’s lending policy and firms’ production incentives. A novelty in the literature,
the model contains a trickle-down mechanism which allows bank credit to circulate across firms
via inter-firm loans. Second, I study the model to understand how the ICM reacts to shocks
to the following empirically critical channels: the BG’s debt-to-equity ratio, the profitability
of production markets and, most importantly, the bank’s credit rationing policy. The model
disentangles the contribution of each channel on the shape of the ICM, as measured in terms
of the intensity of firms’ cross-subsidization. In particular, I discover a non-monotonic rela-
tionship between the latter dimension and the intensity of cross-subsidization. Third, I match
stylized facts of the so called “Korean crisis” and apply the model to discipline some extant
results of the empirical literature: I find that a tightening of the financial market, taken in
isolation, would contribute to a densification of the ICM structure, reflecting the functioning of
the credit-reallocation channel described in the literature. At the same time, the magnitude of
such effect is not sufficiently strong to overcome the reduction in density as caused by the two
alternative channels.
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1. Introduction
Business Groups (BGs) such as Samsung Group or Tata Group are conglomerates of
legally independent firms owned by a common parent company, usually operating in mul-
tiple sectors. A critical feature of business groups across countries is the intense activity
of cross-subsidization taking place between the Production Units (PUs, i.e. the firms)
belonging to the group. For example, by buying and selling loans within their own group,
banks belonging to a US Multibank Holding Company reallocate funds similarly to firms
affiliated in a Korean chaebol or to companies in an Indian business house. Firms in Busi-
ness Groups may decide to resort on pre-existing financing relationships or to establish
new financial ties with other firms with which they share proximity under some dimen-
sion. The degree of formalization of linkages between members as well as the underlying
organization ranges from loose horizontal to tight pyramidal structures (Samphantharak,
2006). Although evidence of BGs activity is widespread across economies at different
stages of market development, the literature fails to identify a comprehensive theoretical
driver for motivating the prevalence of such complex organization. A common denomina-
tor of BGs’ activities around the world is the intense support provided to affiliate firms
to overcome constraints on raising external capital2 (Hoshi et al., 1991).
This paper contributes to the strand of the literature which identifies in the BGs’ ca-
pability to channel external liquidity into an internal capital market (ICM) the reason
for their worldwide ubiquity. A large body of theories builds upon the assumption that
in presence of capital market frictions, financially constrained firms may (be forced to)
drift out of traditional financing venues and initiate complex inter-firm liquidity mar-
kets. While non-excluding for further explanatory layers, the idea that BGs are key for
their capability to attenuate affiliates’ financial constraints by means of the underlying
ICM is appealing for its generality. For example, in the context of the Korean economy,
characterized by a prevalence of conglomerates (i.e. the chaebols) of highly independent
firms, Shin and Park (1999) find that a chaebol firm’s investment is significantly affected
by the cash flow of other firms within the same chaebol even though firms are indepen-
dent legal entities. Along similar lines, Lee et al. (2009) isolate the link between the
intensity of cross-subsidization - the chaebol’s debt-to-equity ratio - and the chaebol’s
market efficiency. They show that the paralyzing effect on ICMs of liquidity regulations
impacts the profitability of the whole conglomerate. Under the assumption that ICMs
are a leading raison d’ être for BGs, the analysis of BG’s efficiency maps into the study
of the direction of capital flows within the BG. In this regards, Almeida et al. (2015)
2Gopalan et al. (2007) provide evidence that more than 70% of intra-group loans in Indian business
groups are funded by external debt financing. I am grateful to a referee for pointing out the latter
remark.
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show that a low-productivity to high-productivity firms capital reallocation exists within
ICMs and that such flow improves the efficiency of BGs. In particular, they find that it
is generally true that BGs reallocate funds to member firms with greater investment op-
portunities. In terms of the financing advantage, Almeida et al. (2011) show that groups
use internal revenues to set up or acquire capital-intensive firms, which are more likely
to be constrained in financial markets. Parallel to (or on top of) this channel, tax-saving
and financial resilience may shape the architecture and the direction of inter-firm capi-
tal allocations (see, in particular, Nicodano and Regis, 2019 and Luciano and Nicodano,
2014). I postpone the discussion on this literature to Section 1.1.
In this paper I make three contributions. First, I motivate observed inter-firm lending
by formalizing a trickle-down mechanism in which bank’s liquidity flows across PUs. The
mechanism sheds light on a credible mechanism for explaining how liquidity circulates
in ICMs. I argue that when banks ration credit and discriminate across borrowers by
linking the amount of extendable credit to a measure of the firms’ pledgeable assets, it is
incentive compatible for a group of financially disconnected PUs within a BG to initiate
a layer of financial transactions. In the model, inter-firm lending incentives are linked to
the structure of the real markets in which firms operate, the financial market determining
the bank’s lending policy and the BG’s debt-to-equity policy. A key aspect of the model
lies in the way capital circulates across a ICM. Coherently with a pervasive empirical
regularity of ICMs (see, for example, Buchuk et al., 2014 and Almeida et al., 2011), capital
trickles-down from larger and more mature low-productivity firms to younger and smaller
high-productivity firms. To capture this feature, I innovate the theoretical literature by
constructing a dynamic internal capital market. In every period new heterogeneously
cash-constrained firms (i.e. the newcomers) access the ICM in order to get capital from
firms that already settled in it (i.e. the mature firms). Similar to empirical ICMs (Lee
et al., 2009), firms in the model are legally independent production units. This raises
two important questions on the mechanics of capital transfer: to what extent lenders can
control their borrowers’ lending decisions and how are borrowers paired to lenders?
I address the first issue by assuming that capital is exchanged via pairwise interactions
and that a lender has no direct control on further capital transfers operated by her
borrowers. Importantly, given the incentive structure, capital may trickle down from
low-productivity to high-productivity firms, allowing for possibly multiple exchanges of
the same assets. Importantly, the fact that exchanges are efficient only on pairwise basis
moderates the overall capability of BGs to reach efficient allocations.
I resolve the second issue discussed above by introducing a probabilistic firm pairing
protocol. The probabilistic mechanism has an important advantage, that is, it is flexible
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in the specification of the exchange rule adopted in the specific3 pairwise transaction.
ICMs are unregulated markets in which PUs come to idiosyncratic pairwise arrangements,
therefore the menu of available contracts can be very sparse. A probabilistic matching
device is therefore a flexible tool that allows for a broad spectrum of unobservable and
noisy contracts. Because of the probabilistic pairing protocol, the trickle-down mechanism
applied to a finite number of firms N can potentially generate a very large number
of lending configurations. I resolve the complexity of interactions by characterizing a
stationary distribution measuring, for any time period, the proportion of lenders with
a given intensity of cross-subsidization and cash holding. This distribution provides a
representation of the equilibrium supply side of the ICM.
From there, I study how real and financial market factors affect via local exchange
incentives the supply shape of the ICM, as measured in terms of the intensity of cross-
subsidization. Therefore, the stationary distribution of cross-subsidization is the unit of
analysis for the rest of the paper. This leads to my second contribution. I study how the
intensity of cross-subsidization changes as a function of the BG’s debt-to-equity ratio,
the profitability of production markets and the bank’s lending policy. For the first two
channels, I devise a monotonic relationship between each factor and the intensity of cross-
subsidization. For the last channel, I show that the relationship between ICM structure
and bank’s borrowing and lending rates is complex and potentially non-monotonic, as a
result of two tensions characterizing bank-firm relationship: first, the bank directly affect
the amount of credit available to firms (and borrowers in the ICM), but at the same time,
it also indirectly affects the internal leverage capability of firms. While the monotonic
relationship is not achievable in general, I show that it can be re-established if the bank’s
policy is sufficiently aggressive. This is the case if the relative cost of bank’s liquidity
(respectively, the risk of the investment) is sufficiently low (respectively, high).
Lastly, I use the model in simulations to better understand the interplay between
external and internal financing on the shape of the supply side of the ICM. Using the
above channels I generate a scenario compatible with the so called "Korean Crisis", a
complex multi-channel shock that hit the Korean economy in 1997-1998. The shock
bore long-lasting consequences on the shape of Korean chaebols’ ICMs (Almeida et al.,
2015). The model disentangles the simultaneous effects generated by the shocks on the
equilibrium distribution of the ICM cross-subsidization. Coherent with the empirical
literature4, the effects I consider are given by a bank credit-crunch that limited ICMs
3In the model, I capture the high degree of idiosyncrasy governing inter-firm capital flow transactions
characterizing empirical ICMs (see, for example, Khanna and Yafeh, 2007) by assuming that exchanges
are subject to pairwise bargaining between PUs.
4See, for a broad discussion on the causes and the consequences of the Korean crisis, Almeida et al.,
2015 and Lee et al., 2009.
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external finance ( captured in the model by higher costs for banks to obtain liquidity on
markets and higher interest rates), new regulations aimed at limiting cross-subsidization5
and a slow-down in the real economy. Overall, the BG’s lending structure reacts to the
complex crisis with a reduction of the ICM density (matching the findings of Lee et al.,
2009), but once we decompose the general effect, we also find that such effect is mostly
due to the cap on debt-to-equity ratio, rather than a shock on rates, in line with Lim
(2012) and Borensztein and Lee (2002).
Methodologically, at the core of market dynamics there is a model of random network
formation6. To my knowledge, this is the second work adopting a network approach to
study the properties of ICMs. From a complementary yet different perspective, Almeida
et al. (2011) reconstructed the expansion of Korean Chaebols by tracking the layer of direct
and indirect ownership relations and the network centrality of each production units.
Our aim here is instead to isolate a theoretical formation mechanism which explains how
bank liquidity trickles down into inter-firm markets so that the realized inter-firm liability
structure matches the empirical regularities outlined above. Furthermore, the mechanism
can be used for deriving the aggregate effect of macro-shocks in an environment of local
interactions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 I construct the dynamic
ICM. First, I establish a formal relationship between individual PUs’ demand for capital,
bank finance and inter-firm finance. Next, I introduce the dynamic mechanism for ICM’s
formation. In Section 3 I derive the central theoretical result of the paper: the charac-
terization of a class of stationary distributions tracking the ICM’s cross-subsidization. I
study the distribution to understand the role of debt-to-equity regulations, market prof-
itability and cost of finance in shaping the lending structure of ICMs. In Section 4,
first, I quantitatively assess the individual effect of each of the above channels on several
features related to the structure of ICM. Second, I calibrate the model to generate a
multi-channel shock similar to the so called Korean Crisis and use it to disentangle the
effect of each channel on the inter-firm lending structure of a ICM. All proofs are collected
in the Appendix.
5Empirically, this coincided with a regulatory shock that prohibited cross-loan guarantees and cross-
shareholdings forced debt-to-equity ratios under 200% (Lee et al., 2009).
6See Jackson and Rogers (2007) and Vega-Redondo (2007) for a discussion of recent contributions.
Random networks allow to project the effect of local interactions into the structural properties of a
resulting aggregate system. However, with respect to the cited models, the formation mechanism here
is pairwise efficient and is driven by micro-founded incentives.
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1.1. Related Literature
Indeed, other mechanisms may motivate the ubiquity of ICMs. When control involves
private benefits, ICMs may be sustained by unilateral incentives of integration. A body
of literature has focused on the one-side incentives of merges and hierarchical control.
In a seminal contribution, La Porta et al. (2002) found that when share-holding is con-
centrated, there might be an incentive for the control group to expropriate minority
share-holders and tunnel resources from the periphery (i.e. newly acquired firms) of the
group to the center of it. In this light, the incentive for group formation is a function of
the stake-holder majority’s powers and therefore, business groups are a mechanism for
resource-concentration. However, incentives for the creation of business groups and fluid
ICMs may be aligned between the firms participating to a business group, regardless of
idiosyncratic features such as the group’s structure and each participant’s relative power.
Within-group collusive tactics may be adopted in order to deter market-entrance (see for
instance Cestone and Fumagalli, 2005) or to gain political leverage which can be used
to push forward the group’s special interest (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006). Although
the focus of the present work is on proposing and formalizing a financing motive driv-
ing the formation of ICMs, the sense of the probabilistic pairing mechanism is to allow
for noisy contracts and (group-level) inefficiency, reflecting the multiplicity of empirical
intra-group financial arrangements.
This work suggests that BG’s efficiency can be improved to some extent by ICMs: ICMs
may smoothen PUs’ access to external finance through a trickle-down mechanism based
upon a noisy pairwise bargaining process. However, BGs may enhance affiliates’ value
also through other channels. An important literature investigates the value-enhancing
role of intra-group state-contingent guarantees between legally separated affiliates. These
are intra-group arrangements widely observed in empirical BGs around the world7. In a
risk-neutral world with no state-contingent guarantees, Leland (2007) studies the relation
between capital structure and corporate value in a trade-off model of optimal leverage
where connected PUs can be merged in one single legal entity. Mergers may destroy
value when the loss of limited liability generates gains from higher optimal debt (and tax
savings) which fail to compensate higher contagion risk due to lower cash-flow diversifica-
tion. Luciano and Nicodano (2014) generalize Leland’s model by introducing conditional
guarantees. The departure is critical as the authors discover that, by enabling both coin-
7In a seminal contribution, Boot et al. (1993) underlines the ubiquity of state-contingent guarantees
between members of holding-groups (e.g., comfort letters, that is promises of rescue sent by the parent
to the affiliates lenders) and provides a reputation-based mechanism for which conditional guarantees
may be preferred to enforceable cross-guarantees as they provide the holding company with flexibility in
managing financial impairment together with the benefits of legal separation among the holding company
entities. I refer the reader to the literature review of Luciano and Nicodano (2014) for evidence on the
use of intra-group guarantees in empirical BGs.
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surance and deflection of contagion risk, conditional guarantees allow for an asymmetric
shift of the leverage profile across BG’s affiliates jointly with an overall expanded debt
capacity. Close to the network formation spirit of my paper, Nicodano and Regis (2019)
expands Luciano and Nicodano (2014) by proposing a general trade-off model in which a
controlling entity optimally decides the ownership share of two subsidiaries, thus allowing
for truly complex structures. Depending on the tax saving - contagion trade-off, these
range from hierarchical (with full or partial subsidiary ownership by parent) to horizontal.
2. Model
2.1. Set-Up
In this section8 I first describe the model set-up in chronological order and then discuss
its main features. Consider an economy made of one loan facility and a large population
of production units (PUs), N ≡
{
1, 2, ..., t̄
}
. A PU i ∈ N is a firm performing four
tasks. First, i ∈ N purchases via cash a homogeneous and divisible input valued Ki
on an anonymous spot market at unitary cost c. Second, input Ki is transformed via a
strictly concave technology f(K) into an equally homogeneous and divisible output qi.
Third, i ∈ N sells output qi on a competitive market generating a unitary revenue equal
to p. Forth, i ∈ N may lend some of the cash obtained from the bank to other firms
j ∈ N . The lending facility is a bank that performs the two following tasks: first, it
acquires liquidity at competitive cost τ (for example, from money markets). Secondly, it
lends cash to firms at competitive rate r. The economy is dynamic and it unfolds along
a discrete timeline t = 0, 1, 2, ..., (t̄+ 1), grouped in three distinct phases (see also Figure
1).
The first phase coincides with period t = 0. In period t = 0 each firm i is born with a
randomly assigned endowment of assets ei ≥ 0. I assume that e is uniformly distributed
according to e ∼ U {0, ē}, with ē > 0. For simplicity, firms are cashless. Each firm i ∈ N
collateralises ei and obtains cash ωi ≥ 0 from the loan facility. The loan facility freely
screens endowment ei, ∀i ∈ N ex-ante the loan is issued, and, depending on financial
parameters τ and r and an exogenous collateral rate χ set over the borrower’s assets,
optimally lends a quantity of cash ωi = ωei , where
ωei ≡ ω(ei; r, τ, χ), i ∈ N,
and since the bank supplies all firms i ∈ N endowed with e = ei a symmetric amount of
8I am profoundly grateful to an anonymous referee who provided excellent guidance for restructuring
this and the next sections.
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credit, the above is equivalent to
ωe ≡ ω(e; r, τ, χ), e ∈ {0, ..., ē} .
From the solution to the bank’s problem (See Section 2.4) I obtain the equilibrium bank
cash distribution, pω ∼ Ω, spanning a cash endowment ωe for each asset endowment
0 ≤ e ≤ ē.
The second phase of the model corresponds to periods t ∈
{
1, 2, ..., t̄
}
. In this phase, each
firm i ∈ N satisfies her outstanding demand for cash Di ≥ 0 by sequentially entering, one
per period in increasing order, in the internal capital market (ICM), formally defined as
DEFINITION 1 (Internal Capital Market). For each period t ∈
{
1, 2, ..., t̄
}
, let the
internal capital market (ICM) be the pool of PUs t′ ∈ Nt−1 = {1, 2, ..., t− 1} ⊂ Nt̄. Let
a generic PU entering the ICM at t, i = t be the newcomer, and firm t′ ∈ Nt−1 be the
mature PU, respectively. Furthermore, let Kt′(t) ≥ 0 and s̄t′(t − 1) ≥ 0 be the cash
endowment (i.e. the loanable funds) and the outstanding transfers (i.e. the total amount
of outstanding loans) of t′ ∈ Nt−1 at time when firm t enters in the ICM, respectively.
Due to the sequential structure, I can write Di = Dt. I assume that the additional source
of cash Dt is constrained by exogenous corporate regulations α ≥ 0 and β ≥ 0 that
bound - at ICM-level - the maximum amount of funding firms can individually obtain
from (provide to) other firms. More precisely, the following assumption holds
ASSUMPTION 1 (Cross-Subsidization). A proportional constraint α (respectively, β)
applied on ωi bounds the quantity of loans i ∈ N can get from (respectively, provide to)
other PUs in the ICM9.
In every period t, newcomer i = t collects her outstanding demand for cash Dt as
follows. A random matched with one firm t′ ∈ Nt−1 is created according to a protocol I
characterize in detail in Section 2.7. If parties agree to exchange, cash ℓtt′ > 0 is trans-
ferred from t′ to t against a pairwise-set interest rate ιtt′ > 0 and the lender (respectively,
the borrower) will revise the amount of loanable funds Kt′ and loans s̄t′ (respectively, the
outstanding demand for cash Dt) to reflect the realized exchange. Whether the parties
agree to exchange or not, the match dissolves and the process iterates to new matches
until firm t exhausts her outstanding demand Dt and settles in the pool of potential
lenders Nt. Subsequently, the economy progresses to t+ 1 and the process repeats.
The last phase of the model coincides with the conclusive period of the economy, t = t̄+1.
There, each firm i ∈ N optimally chooses an investment level Ii(ωi; p, c, α, β), with Ii
9See for instance Almeida et al. (2015) and Almeida et al. (2011) for a discussion of the real effect of
regulations on the empirical counter-part of α and β in the context of Korean Chaebols.
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constrained by (see Assumption 1)
−βωi ≤ Ii ≤ αω,
so that i ∈ N uses a total cash amount equal to (Ii +ωi) to purchase input Ki. Input Ki
is transformed into the divisible output qi via a strictly concave production technology
f(·). Eventually, output qi is sold on the competitive output market generating a unitary
revenue equal to p. Payment of bank and firm credit takes place ex-post sales.
Parameters. The following coefficients are taken as fixed by agents populating the
model: the market structure, defined as the vector M ≡ (p, c, α, β, r, τ, χ), the parameters
(0, ē) regulating the endowment distribution and the production technology f(·).
Notation. Subscripts indicate parameters, terms in brackets are variables. In the rest
of the paper, I refer to i ∈ N as a generic PU. When dealing with the dynamics of the
ICM, I label each period t’s newcomer i and any generic mature firm j, with i, j ∈ N ,
such as i = t and j = t′. Lastly, I refer to firm i’s bank loan ωi ≥ 0 as firm i’s type. Since
most of results in the paper are general in the sense that they are type-dependent rather
than firm-dependent, when possible, the firm identifier will be dropped.
2.2. Solution and Main Features of the Model
The main goal of this paper is to isolate a nexus between the financial and macroeconomic
environment and the evolving shape of the dynamic ICM. The ICM will be studied in
terms of its lending side by tracking the distribution of inter-PU cross-subsidization. To
solve the dynamic model, I further characterize the incentive structure by introducing
the following set of assumptions
ASSUMPTION 2 (Financing Structure). For any given PU i ∈ N ,
1. Bank loans are determined ex-ante Ii. As the bank is exogenous to the ICM, bank
rates are non negotiable and enter as a cost in the determination of Ii.
2. Cross-subsidization is constrained by internal debt-to-equity regulations. PUs are
leverage-constrained and the internal debt mechanism is such that inter-firm pair-
wise rates ι do not enter directly in the determination of Ii.
3. Inter-firm pairwise rates ι are on top of the bank rate r. As a consequence of
Assumptions 2.1-2.2, bank rates exogenously bound the internal debt structure of
the ICM.
Assumption 2.1 allows me to study how the dynamics of the inter-firm lending structure
react to shocks to external finance10 holding the latter as fixed, or in other words, I disci-
10Technically, this assumption enables the unique stationary distribution of inter-firm loans (see Section
3.1).
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pline the relationship between the sources of finance to isolate first-order effects of bank
shocks. Indeed, there are many environments where banks operate above the competitive
margin (see Buchuk et al., 2014) and ICMs may help improving the credit spread through
the coinsurance implicit in cross-subsidization. Improving the debt capacity of affiliates
is a leading motivation for the creation of complex business structures (see Section 1.1
for a discussion of the main contributions of this approach, in particular Nicodano and
Regis, 2019 and Luciano and Nicodano, 2014). The first part of Assumption 2.2 is con-
sistent with the empirical organization of BGs around the world (Lee et al., 2009). The
second part enables an arbitrage opportunity: it is possible for PUs to be at the same
time borrowers and lenders in the inter-firm market11. Relatively to Assumption 2.3, it
is widely observed that intra-group lenders compute loan rates in terms of spreads from
conventional money markets (see for instance Allen et al., 2019 and Buchuk et al., 2014),
with the noticeable exception of Indian BGs (Gopalan et al., 2007).
Given Assumption 2, I can now introduce the information structure and the decision-
making of agents populating the economy.
Information Structure and Solution of the Model. At t = 0, the bank observes
endowments ei, ∀i ∈ N , financial parameters (r, τ, χ) and market conditions (p, c), on
the ground of which12 the bank maximizes expected profits by optimally designing a
lending scheme ωe, ∀e ∈ {0, 1, ..., ē}. In period t = 0, each firm i ∈ N observes her
own endowment ei, her cash loan ωi, the elements of the market structure (p, c, α, β)
and technology f(·), on the ground of which i ∈ N optimally plans the investment level
I(ωi; p, c, α, β). In period t = 1, ..., t̄ each firm t and t′ ∈ Nt−1 additionally observes the
vector of cash endowments {Kt′(t)}t−1t′=1 and Dt. Every matched couple t and t′ observes
ℓtt′ and ιtt′ .
The model is endowed with three critical innovations relative to extant models of ICM
structure (see, e.g., Almeida et al., 2015). First, the economy is non-stationary. This
structure is motivated by the fact that firms populating empirical ICMs have heteroge-
neous age and such maturity strongly correlates with firms’ financing behaviour (Khanna
and Yafeh, 2007). As a second critical feature, similar to Almeida et al. (2015), firms
have heterogeneous asset endowments e. An innovation of the present setting is that the
ICM is complemented with a formal financial sector. This is accessed by firms ex-ante
entering the ICM. To isolate a clear-cut link between financial markets and ICMs, firms
are cashless13, yet each firm i ∈ N can collateralize ei and obtain cash ωe from the loan
11Note however that the Assumption is moderated by the fact that in this paper intra-group exchanges
have to be incentive-compatible on pairwise basis to realize (see Section 2.6)
12Since corporate regulations α and β dictating inter-firm exchanges are unknown to the bank, the
bank will take firms’ sales p · qi as random variable.
13The introduction of an intermediate case with heterogeneous cash endowments would allow to con-
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facility. Importantly, corporate regulations α and β dictating inter-firm exchanges are
unknown to the bank, and as such firms’ sales p · f(K) are taken as random variable.
The process governing bank-firm lending relationship will be entirely captured by the
equilibrium bank cash distribution pω ∼ Ω, which dictates the degree of heterogeneity of
firms’ cash endowments. Indeed, pω will play an important role since it contributes to
determine the size and thickness of the ICM. The third element of novelty of this work
is given by the protocol used by PU i ∈ N for collecting Di. Given her outstanding
demand for cash, i ∈ N is paired with one or multiple firms residing in the ICM. The
cash is exchanged against an interest rate ι (a price), obtained as the result of pairwise
bargaining14.
In order to study how the environment affects the properties of the lending side of
the ICM, I will focus on the asymptotic properties of the ICM and make the following
assumption
ASSUMPTION 3 (Temporal Structure). Assume that the last phase of the model takes
place indeterminately later, that is t̄ → ∞.
In the rest of the section, I will first determine each firm’s target investment and the
bank lending scheme, on the ground of which I can derive the ICM-level demand and
supply of capital. Lastly, I will introduce inter-firm exchanges and study the evolution of
the lending side of the ICM.
2.3. Determination of Target Investment Structure (t = 0)
In period t = 0, each firm i ∈ N endowed with ei receives a bank loan corresponding
to ω = ωei ≥ 0 (determined in Section 2.4) and optimally sets her investment target
Ii = I(ωi; p, c, α, β) by solving a one-shot problem. As firms are symmetric conditional
on type ω, in the following I drop the firm identifier and claim each firm endowed with
sider a scenario in which loans descending from bank credit can be (partially) crowed-out in favor of
intra-group credit exchanged based upon internal resources. Albeit heterogeneous cash endowments can
be a relevant venue for studying certain phenomena (such as the resilience of business groups to external
shocks Allen et al., 2019), it would not alter the effects of bank discrimination on the topology of the
ICM, the focus of the present study.
14The use of entrusted loans for inter-firm capital flows instead of governance-related mechanisms (e.g.
share issuance) and the related wide spectrum of interest rates is predominant in many types of ICMs
(Allen et al., 2019; Buchuk et al., 2014). The bargaining mechanism and the pairing device I devise are
agnostic on the degree of control exerted by lenders on borrowers, thus allowing for a broad spectrum of
(noisy) configurations. Furthermore, the resulting formation protocol is such that economic incentives,





























































































































































































































































































































ω ∈ Ω optimally adjusts Iω to I∗ω by solving the following problem
max
Iω
Πω = p · f (Iω + ω) − c · (Iω + ω)
s.t : −βω ≤ Iω ≤ αω,
(1)
in which Iω is the investment, and may take negative values in case of excess cash
resources. In order to isolate the nexus between inter-firm and bank lending, I assume
that transformation costs are negligible15 and therefore impose that
c = r,
that is the level of investment is adjusted by considering the leverage constraint and
the cost of bank lending, and is independent from any additional rate charged on inter-
firm loans (as long as Assumption 1 is maintained). Intuitively, because bank rates are
non negotiable, they must enter (either via direct loans or incorporated in inter-firm
loans) the cost structure as a fixed component16. The extent of cross-subsidization is
restricted on the basis of leverage bounds α and β set at corporate level. With respect
to empirical ICMs, the debt-to-equity ratio is critical also outside the realm of purely
financial business groups17 (see for instance Holod and Peek, 2010) and it is frequently
targeted by policy makers. For example, Lee et al. (2009) provide empirical evidence
of the effects engendered on Korean conglomerates by an exogenous change in α in the
aftermath of Korean 1997 financial crisis. In the following I assume β = 1, corresponding
to a lower bound −ω ≤ Iω and α ≥ 0. In order to construct a segmentation of firms’
behaviour as a function of their cash type, I define the first-best type ω ≡ ω∗∗ such as
DEFINITION 2 (First-best type). Let ω ≡ ω∗∗ be the first-best type of the economy,
defined as
ω∗∗p,r : I∗(ω∗∗p,r;α, r, p) = 0. (2)
Type ω∗∗p,r agents make no investment as they are endowed with the first-best liquidity
level, independently of the exogenous constraint α. Hence, ω∗∗p,r rates the profitability of
the industry as a function of the optimal unconstrained production level (which depends
on the market-wide unit revenue p and cost c). When possible, in the following I will
drop the subscripts and simply refer to ω∗∗.
15The assumption simplify non-essential comparative statics and can be easily relaxed with no effect
on any of the main results.
16By imposing c = r it is immediate to recover from Assumption 1 the spread structure as described
in the empirical literature (see for instance Allen et al., 2019).
17Looking at aggregate leverage ratios, Buchuk et al. (2014) find that recipients of intra-group transfers
in Chilean business groups have leverage ratios that are 7 − 10% higher than non-conglomerated firms.
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2.4. Bank Lending policy (t = 0)
My treatment of the bank’s lending policy is designed to match some critical empirical
regularities in the bank-firm relation and, a novelty, to study how the policy shapes the
morphology of the ICM18. In this sense, I expand Freimer and Gordon (1965) classical
framework to account for borrowers with heterogeneous endowments. The bank faces an
adverse selection problem (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981 and Smith, 1987) when attempting to
ration credit by price. Instead, the bank offers competitive interest rates and ration loans
by assets evaluation19. I assume that the bank acquires (lends) liquidity at competitive
cost τ (rate r). In the first phase of the model, the bank arranges the lending policy ωe,
defined as
ωe ≡ ω(e; r, τ, χ) = g · e, e ∈ {0, ..., ē} ,
by optimally selecting the leverage g ≥ 0 contingent to: (i) the borrower’s internal funds
ei and (ii) macro-variables p, c, r and technology f(·), that allow the bank to compute
the first-best type ω∗∗p,r. The bank investment is worth Ze ≡ min {χe, (1 + r)ωe}. The
expression implies that conditional on the realization of the project, the bank either
realizes the planned profit, or gets an expected amount χe after writing off a failed
project. Typically, χ indicates a positive amount of capital defined in terms of a share χ
of the initial endowment e, that is a recovery rate or a collateral over the PU’s internal
funds: χe = χ · e with χ ∈ [0, 1]20. As firms can not commit ex-ante to their sales
pf(Ki), i ∈ N and the bank does not know the internal debt-to-equity ratio α (i.e,
the extent of inter-firm funding), the bank computes the expected proceeds of her own
investment Ze according to an estimate over the range of possible sales. To do so, the





∗∗) − e > 1
1 otherwise
, (3)
18As the angle of this paper is to isolate the contribution of a trickle-down financing mechanism to the
formation of ICMs, I deviate from the traditional contract-theoretic framework (such as Gertner et al.,
1994) and condense all contract-theoretic concerns in the bank-firm relationship, thus assuming perfect
enforcement at the firm-firm relationship.
19The rationing proposed here is consistent with the empirical finding of a large literature investigating
the nexus between bank rationing and BG performance (see, for example, Gopalan et al., 2007).
20Banks and regulators may enforce a tight interpretation of loss given default over a single position.
For instance, by netting the collateral from a range of standard expected penalties (such as litigation
costs) that become apparent once the project fails, the bank may estimate a χ within the more eventful
interval [−1, 1]. By analyzing a large sample of small business non-performing bank loans, Eales and
Bosworth (1998) provide strong evidence of a convex relation between severity and frequency of loss given
default. Relevantly, losses given default exceeding by up to the 20% of the principal (i.e. χ = −0.2) are
reported twice the frequency with respect to cases with recovery rates range in χ ∈ [0.7, 0.9].
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so that Ze is distributed according to ρ. In the above, risk increases in the distance
between endowment e first-best sales, pf(ω∗∗)21. Because the bank conditions liquidity
provision on the PU’s assets, I express ωe in terms of the implied leverage g = ωee .
This formulation directly reflects that when a firm borrows against its assets, borrowing
capacity depends upon the collateral size. Therefore, the bank maximizes the expected















χ · eρds +
∫ p·f(ω∗∗)
ge(1+r)
ge(1 + r)ρds − (1 + τ)ge. (4)
The first component reflects the expected outcome in case of firm’s default (correspond-
ing to the seized collateral in the standard interpretation of χ ∈ [0, 1] or a penalty for
χ < 0), net of trade credit exposures. The second component, which is pinned down by
the investment profitability is the expected profit conditional on the investment’s success.
The third component is the cost of capital. Then, I have the following
Proposition 1. Let Ap,r,τ be the flat-base loan and Br,τ,χ the type-based discrimination,
respectively given by Ap,r,τ ≡ p · f(ω∗∗) · (r−τ)2(1+r)2 and by Br,τ,χ ≡
χ(1+r)+(1+τ)
2(1+r)2 . Let Ω ≡
{Ap,r,τ , ..., Ap,r,τ + ē ·Br,τ,χ} be the equilibrium endowment space. Then,
1. A unique optimal lending policy ωe = g∗e, ∀ω ∈ Ω exists and is given by
ωe =
Ap,r,τ + e ·Br,τ,χ for r ≥ τ0 otherwise. (5)
2. Let θ be the bank’s relative cost of liquidity sourcing, defined as θ ≡ 1+τ1+r , the optimal
credit rationing policy is an increasing (decreasing) function of the borrower’s type
if and only if χ > −θ (χ < −θ).
3. Let e∗p,r,τ as defined in (B.1) (Appendix B). For all endowment e < e∗p,r,τ (respec-
tively, e ≥ e∗p,r,τ ), the optimal credit rationing policy ω is an increasing (respectively,
decreasing) function of the bank rate r. Furthermore, for θ < 1/2, there exists
p̄θ > 0 such that for p > p̄θ, it holds that e∗p,r,τ < 0 and the optimal credit rationing
policy ω is a decreasing function of r.
4. Let êp,r ≡ pf(ω∗∗) be the pivotal type and consider money market costs τ1, τ2 such
that τ2 > τ1 > 0. It holds that ω(e′; τ2) > ω(e′; τ1) (respectively, ω(e′; τ2) < ω(e′; τ1))
for e′ > êp,r (respectively, e′ < êp,r).
21This simple risk structure instruments the potential firm’s operational risk (see Freimer and Gordon,
1965) with a bound on the firm’s return on asset (ROA). In the model, operations are simply given by
input transformation and marketing of output.
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5. Cash endowment ω is distributed according to the uniform equilibrium distribution
pω, defined as




for ω ∈ Ω and pω = 0 otherwise. From (6) is immediate to define Pω as the CDF
associated to pω.
When lending rate is at least enough to cover the money market cost (i.e. r ≥ τ), the
optimal lending in (5) is a proportional two-parts scheme. The first component is a
flat-base loan which incorporates the net profitability of production discounted for the
bank credit costs. The second component is a type-specific premium added on the top
of the base loan. I briefly discuss the equilibrium behaviour of pω in relation to each of
the macro-variables by making use of the criterion of First Order Stochastic Dominance
(FOSD)22
• Improvement of production market’s profitability. Since B is non affected by p, p
induces a linear right-shift of the support Ω via A, thus implying that when the
market price p grows, the bank uniformly raises loans to all borrower types e. In
terms of distribution properties, p′ω(p′)
FO
≻ pω(p) for p′ > p.
• Increment of bank’s interest rate. Two cases are possible, depending on the com-
position of Ω. If e∗p,r,τ < 0 (equivalent to θ < 1/2 and p > p̄θ) a hike of the bank’s
interest rate reduces both A and B (that is Ω shrinks), and as such, pω(r)
FO
≻ p′ω(r′)
for r′ > r. Otherwise, if e∗p,r,τ > 0 a result in terms of distribution’s dominance can
not be established as lending behaviour will be endowment-specific.
• Increment of money market’s cost. An increment of bank’s financing cost τ reduces
A and makes B steeper, so that when money markets become more expensive, the
bank discriminates more intensively between borrowers, with the result of increasing
(respectively, reducing) credit available for large (respectively, small) firms such that
e ≥ êp,r (respectively, e < êp,r).
• Increase of recovery rate. An increment of χ implies a positive shift of B with a
neutral effect on A, which translates in the expansion of Ω, and in terms of the
distribution, it implies that p′ω(χ′)
FO
≻ pω(χ) for χ′ > χ. Therefore, when the bank’s
recovery rate improves, the bank unambiguously extends credit lines to all types e.
22Given two univariate distributions pω and p′ω, pω First Order Stochastic Dominates p′ω or, equiva-
lently, pω
FO
≻ p′ω if pω ≤ p′ω ∀ ω ∈ Ω. This is to say that the mass of the distribution moves upward on














Figure 2: The market segmentation for a given α > 0 and ω∗∗ < ω̄. Given the profit function
Πω in (1), types are segmented via Dω as obtained in Proposition 2.
2.5. The Demand Structure of ICM (t = 0)
At t = 0, given the bank’s optimal lending policy ωe, each PU i ∈ N receives ωei and
induces the following type-based demand for cash Di = Dωi = Dω ≥ 0 (for convenience I









I characterize the demand segmentation at type level Dω as a function of ω∗∗p,r and α and
provide a necessary aggregate condition for the emergence of the capital market.
Proposition 2 (Market Segmentation). (i) For each ω ∈ Ω, the constraint α and the
first-best type ω∗∗(p, r), the continuous function Dω : Ω → Ω maps each type in its own
demand for capital such as:
Dω =

α · ω ∀ω ∈ D∗
ω∗∗ − ω ∀ω ∈ D∗∗
0 ∀ω ∈ S
(8)
with: D∗ ≡ {ω ∈ Ω : ω ≤ ω∗∗/(1 + α)}, D∗∗ ≡ {ω ∈ Ω : ω∗∗/(1 + α) ≤ ω < ω∗∗}, S ≡
{ω ∈ Ω : ω ≥ ω∗∗}.
(ii) The average demand for capital D(α, ω∗∗) = D∗ +D∗∗ is given by the quantity










(iii) D(α, ω∗∗) is concave with respect to α and convex with respect to ω∗∗p,r.
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Importantly, Dω defines the quantity of capital with which every PU type aims to settle
in the market as a (static) function of the bank lending policy and the debt-to-equity
regulations. PU of type ω ∈ D∗ (respectively, ω ∈ D∗∗) are fully (respectively, partially)
constrained borrowers, that is they will borrow at capacity (respectively, up to match first
best endowment ω∗∗p,r) from other PUs. Firms of type ω ∈ S on the other hand will enter
the ICM with zero demand for capital, Dω = 0, and we will refer to firms belonging to S
as non-borrowers or, alternatively, as pure lenders. For convenience, I also define
Kω ≡ ω +Dω (10)
such as the cash holdings of a PUs, that is the cash a PU settles in the ICM with as
potential lender for next periods PUs.
2.6. Intra-group exchange incentives (t > 0)
Consider a generic period t > 0 such that t < t̄ and fix (t, t′) to be a match between t and
t′, where t is the newcomer characterized by a (possibly null) demand for cash Dt = Dωt
and t′ is a generic lender t′ ∈ Nt−1, with t′ < t. In this subsection I hold the match as
fixed and introduce the incentive structure of capital transfer from t′ to t. In the next
section I will look in detail at the matching process and the dynamics of ICM.
At time t, the lender is characterized by a cash endowment Kt′(t) ≥ 0 and outstanding
loans s̄t′(t − 1) ≥ 0 (See Definition 1), which I keep fixed in this section. I leverage As-
sumption 2.2 to characterize pairwise capital flow from t′ to t. I assume this is given by
exchange of cash loan ℓtt′ > 0 against an "interest rate" ιtt′ > 0, which will be computed
against the lender’s most obvious outside option, that is the employment of the resources
for direct production23. Coherent with a founding empirical regularity24 of the financing
motive for ICMs existence (Buchuk et al., 2014), for transactions to be incentive com-
patible it is necessarily that the interest rate is at least sufficient to cover the lender’s
ongoing projects. Therefore, I introduce an exchange incentive compatibility condition.
The condition restricts the set of feasible exchanges to pairwise efficient combinations of
cash loans ℓtt′ and loan interest rate ιtt′ .
23Notice that it is such incentive structure that opens up an interesting arbitrage opportunity where
borrower t ∈ Nt becomes a potential lender for borrower t′′ > t accessing the ICM in next periods, thus
effectively spreading the bank’s capital through the ICM, coherently with a pervasive empirical regularity
of ICMs (see, for example, Buchuk et al., 2014 and Almeida et al., 2011), where capital trickles-down
from larger and more mature low-productivity firms to younger and smaller high-productivity firms.
24Gopalan et al. (2007) show that interest rates charged by lenders can have only a latent connection
with those of formal money market in Indian Business groups. By looking at Chinese entrusted loans,
official interest rates act as a further lower bound (Allen et al., 2019). A mechanism based upon exchange
of liquidity against internal equity would prioritize strategic incentives rather than financing incentives
behind the ICM. It is unclear which motif is predominant (see Buchuk et al. (2014) for a discussion ).












Figure 3: The space of incentive-compatible exchanges between a newcomer t and a potential lender t′,
respectively endowed with ωt and Kt′(t), as obtained from Assumption 4 is given by area ABC. In the
graph, production function f(K) is logarithmic. On the x-axis: loan size ℓtt′ , y-axis: boundaries ῑlt′ and
ῑut on interest rate ιtt′ .
ASSUMPTION 4 (Incentive Compatibility of Exchanges). Given a lender (respectively,
the newcomer) t′ ∈ Nt−1 endowed at t with Kt′(t) (respectively, ωt), with t′ < t, a loan
ℓtt′ at interest rate ιtt′ has to be incentive compatible to take place, whereby incentive
compatibility requires that










p [f(Kt′(t)) − f(Kt′(t) − ℓtt′)]
ℓtt′
+ r, ῑuωt ≡
p [f(ωt + ℓtt′) − f(ωt)]
ℓtt′
− r.
To motivate the above, observe that the exchange is incentive compatible for lender t′ if
p · f (Kt′(t) − ℓtt′) + ιtt′ℓtt′ − r (Kt′(t) − ℓtt′) ≥ p · f (Kt′(t)) − r ·Kt′(t),
in which the right hand side is the opportunity cost and ι = ῑlKt′ (t) equalizes the inequality.
The bound ῑuωt is symmetrically obtained for the borrower t. For any transfer ℓtt′ , the
assumption provides necessary conditions on terms of trade for a bilateral trade to take
place. These conditions map directly into each party’s endowment ωt, Kt′(t), which in
turn depends on bank loans and the residual cash retained by potential lenders t′ ∈ Nt−1
for direct production (formally defined in Section 2.7). To simplify the exchange structure,
I further assume the following
ASSUMPTION 5 (Size of loans are fixed). For every matching (t, t′), t, t′ ∈ N , assume
that the size of loans is fixed, ℓtt′ = ℓ, ℓ > 0 so that every matched couple (t, t′) bargains
only over the interest rate ιtt′.
The dimension of the window of jointly acceptable rates expands in the lender’s availabil-
ity of funds. I assume that borrowers order lenders according to a measure of attractive-
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ness which is determined by the spread between the maximum interest rate payable by
the borrower and the minimum interest rate acceptable for the lender. Hence, for each
matched pair (t, t′), define attractiveness of lender as follows
DEFINITION 3 (Attractiveness of Lender). Let a matched pair (t, t′) respectively en-





The attractiveness function is convex and increasing in the endowments of the lender and
convex and decreasing in the endowment of the borrower. I use the notion in Section 2.7
as the main element of PUs’ exchange protocol.
2.7. Exchange Dynamics and Formation of ICMs (t > 0)
Consider again a generic period t > 0. In this section, I characterize the dynamics of
ICMs. To do so, I first build the law of motion of loanable funds for any generic lender
t′ ∈ Nt−1. From Assumption 5, it follows that s̄t′(t−1) = ℓ ·st′(t−1), where st′(t−1) ≥ 0
is the number of loans supplied by lender t′ along the time interval |t−t′|. Then, loanable
funds are simply given by
Kt′(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
loanable funds
= ωt′ +Dt′︸ ︷︷ ︸
initial cash holdings
− st′(t− 1) · ℓ︸ ︷︷ ︸
loaned cash
, (14)
in which it holds that25 Kt′(t′) = ωt′ +Dt′ = Kωt′ . Furthermore, budget constrain limits
inter-firm exposure such that Kt′(t) ≥ 0 ∀t ≥ 0.
Next I characterize the dynamics of exchanges across periods. ICMs are unregulated
markets in which PUs come to idiosyncratic pairwise arrangements, hence the menu of
available contracts can be very sparse (see, e.g., Khanna and Palepu, 2000 and Khanna
and Yafeh, 2007). Therefore, I introduce a probabilistic exchange protocol to allow for
a broad spectrum of unobservable and noisy contracts. Formally, in the following I
construct a probability ξt′(t) of exchanges between a newcomer t and potential lender
t′ ∈ Nt−1. This is given by the following
DEFINITION 4 (Exchange probability). Given a mature firm t′ ∈ Nt−1 endowed with
Kt′(t) and a newcomer t, let ξt′(t) be the probability of an exchange of capital ℓ to take
place from t′ to t, and define it as
ξ′t′(t) ≡
P (t is matched with t′) · P (trade realizes | Dωt , Kt′(t)) for Kt′(t) > 00 otherwise (15)
25Importantly, the evolution of st′(t) ≥ 0 will proxy the analysis of ICM formation in Section 3.
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I now introduce three assumptions to produce a tractable expression for ξt′(t). First,
ASSUMPTION 6. Given a newcomer t and two potential lenders t′, t′′ ∈ Nt−1, the
probability ξ(·) is increasing in the lender’s attractiveness. In other words, ξt′′(t) < ξt′(t)
if and only if Γt′′(ωt, Kt′′(t)) < Γt′(ωt, Kt′(t)), in which Kt′(t) and Kt′′(t) follow the law
of motion in (14).
Assumption 6 is actually weak. It captures the empirical (and possibly noisy) counter-
part of pairwise efficiency: irrespective of the actual distribution of the exchange surplus
and for any postulated bargaining mechanism, matched parties (or their parent entity)
prefer to trade with a counterpart for which the measure of attractiveness in (13) is wider,
as the higher the probability the financial exchange is pareto-improving, the more likely
is to take place. The mechanism is coherent with the findings of Almeida et al. (2015),
which show that in Korean ICMs liquidity goes from low-productivity firms to high-
productivity firms and transfers are pairwise incentive compatible. Given the incentive
structure in Section 2.6, I make two observations. First, the attractiveness of a lender
t′ ∈ Nt−1 depends on her own endowments Kt′(t), on the borrower’s type ωt and also
on the amount of capital x ≤ Dωt that the borrower collected on market before being
matched to t′. At the same time, the maximum gains that a borrower t (or, equivalently,
her controlling entity) can make out of ℓ by using it in production is fixed and only
depends on the market structure. This allows to define the average attractiveness of a
lender t′ (respectively, of the ICM) such as
DEFINITION 5 (Average Attractiveness of a Lender and of ICM). Let t′ ∈ Nt−1







(Γt′( x , ω,Kt′(t)) · pω) dxdω.






(ῑuω(x, ω) · pω) dxdω. (16)
Hence, γ(Kt′(t)) averages the attractiveness of a lender t′ across all possible types of
newcomers ω ∈ D ⊂ Ω that already collected an amount x < Dω of liquidity target Dω
along the intra-period search. On the other hand, ϕ evaluates on average the maximum
gains that a newcomer ω (or, equivalently, her controlling entity) can make out of ℓ in
the production market, given any level of capital she may have already raised in the ICM
and any initial endowment. By providing a metrics for the potential gains that come
from a transaction - regardless to their assignation between the borrower and lender - ϕ
measures the welfare incentives to participate to ICMs for single PUs. Second, I assume
the following
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ASSUMPTION 7. The matching process is random.
For large t, the probability for a borrower to be matched with a lender dissolves into 1/t.





Given the exchange incentives and the current size of the ICM, two equally appealing
lenders have the same probability of being matched to a newcomer. This simple matching
assumption provides a departure from optimality of ICM capital allocation (Nicodano
and Regis, 2019, Shin and Park, 1999) which is moderated by the fact that the exchange
probability expands in the lender’s availability of funds and in all cases, exchanges have
to be pairwise efficient to realize. Lastly, I assume that
ASSUMPTION 8. Lender’s financial exposure is allowed to grow unboundedly in (14).
In other words, Kt′(t) is unbounded. A priori, the approximation appears at odds with
the inter-firm exchange structure (Section 2.6), where firms’ endowments drive exchange
incentives. However, I moderate the assumption by exploiting Assumption 5 and approx-
imate







is a first order approximation fixing the increment in marginal productivity caused by
the reduction of residual capital Kt′(t) as lender t′ increases exposure against other PUs.
Hence, the attractiveness of t′ is thus affected by her own type, the quantity of capital
she raises before settling in the market and the number of loans she already issued in
the market. Therefore, absent a formal budget constraint, the exchange probability re-
tains the ordering structure of Section 2.6. Nonetheless, it is possible that the qualitative
properties of the stationary inter-firm lending distributions derived in Section 3 are im-
pinged by Assumption 8. To assess the robustness of my results, in Appendix A I notice
that the introduction of a budget constraint may be interpreted as a truncation of the
distributions. Therefore, in Proposition 10 I show that one of the main results derived in
Section 3 is robust to any truncation26. A similar argument applies to all other analytical
26Furthermore, in Section 4.1 I confirm in simulations the validity of the assumptions made in this
section.
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results of Section 327. Given the assumptions, ξt′(t) becomes
ξt′(t) =
ϕr,τ,χ,α,ω∗∗
t ·m(ωt′) · st′(t− 1) · ℓ
, (18)
Notice that the denominator of ξt′(t) indicates the current productivity of t′ and it
entirely depends on t′ characteristics and her investment decisions.
3. Analysis
3.1. Stationary ICMs
In this paper, the dynamic ICM is studied in terms of the evolution of inter-PU cross-
subsidization, that is the lending side of the ICM. Hence, the evolution of the exchange
protocol ξt′(t) drives the formation of ICM. The probability ξt′(t) rests on the determi-
nation of cash loans st′(t). However, the complexity of tracking the granular evolution of
st′(t) along the entire formation path t′, t′ + 1, ... rapidly grows to intractable dimensions
since it is a function on the decision of all firms in the ICM. To overcome the high de-
gree of complexity regulating the above law of motion, I take as unit of analysis for the
dynamical ICM the following
DEFINITION 6 (ICM Architecture). Given types ω ∈ Ω and s ≥ 0, and given the
exchange probability in (18), let t → ∞ and define P (s, ω) such as the probability distri-
bution of inter-firm loans s and types ω ∈ Ω. I refer to P (s, ω) as the ICM architecture
of the model.
Importantly, since any ICM drawn from the class P (s, ω) is equally likely, the result is not
conditioned on the identities of the individual firms: the ICM architecture is anonymous
in the sense that it maps in a frequency each combination of firm’s type and total number
of loans issued in the ICM28. I address the high degree of randomness involved with
the determination of P (s, ω) by adopting a mean-field approximation (see for instance
Bramoullé et al., 2012). In the mean-field approximation, all trading actions take place
deterministically at a rate proportional to the expected change. On that ground, I will
ascertain the properties of the emerging architectures in the limit of t → ∞. I proceed
to the core Theorem of the paper which grounds the rest of the analysis.
Theorem 1 (Existence and Uniqueness of ICM architecture). Given the probability de-
fined in (18) and a market structure (p, c, α, β, r, τ, χ), there exists a unique ICM archi-
27Furthermore, out of the present model where external finance is placed ex-ante the ICM formation,
the approximation in (17) appears to be reasonable under the empirical observation that firms can go
through several rounds of external financing (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). Hence, a model with dynamical
bank re-financing would allow to organically incorporate the Assumption.
28Hence, the distribution-based approach avoids an analysis based upon ad hoc ICMs structures, and
as such can be tested against data.
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tecture P (s, ω), given by








for ω ∈ Ω and P (s, ω) = 0 for ω < Ap,r,τ and P (s, ω) = 1 for ω ≥ Ap,r,τ + ēBr,τ,χ. The
associated density p(s, ω) is given by
p(s, ω) = 1
ēBr,τ,χ






for ω ∈ Ω and p(s, ω) = 0 for ω /∈ Ω. In the above, ϕ is the market profitability as defined
in (16) and Ap,r,τ and Br,τ,χ are as defined in Proposition 1.
The distribution P (s, ω) characterizes the lending side of the ICM and depends only on
the market structure and on the size of the loans. Therefore, even though the economy
in our framework is highly dynamic and non-stationary due to the growing pool of firms
and their underlying financial ramifications, I am able to obtain a stationary distribution
P (s, ω) which provides a testable benchmark for measuring the impact of regulations and
macro-economic shocks at firm’s type ω level. I can now discuss some general properties
of the ICMs and map them to the extant literature.
3.2. Size of PU bank loans and Intensity of Cross-subsidization
Preliminary to the analysis, I show that stationary ICM architectures as derived in Section
3.1 conform to a structural regularity of observed ICMs: liquidity provision is asymmetric
in ICM. Liquidity goes from low-productivity (larger) firms to high-productivity (smaller)
firms (see Buchuk et al., 2014, Almeida et al., 2015, Gilchrist and Zakrajšek, 1998 ). In
other words, the trickle-down mechanism introduced in this paper can provide substantial
ground for observed ICMs dynamics at pairwise level. I summarize this in the following,
Proposition 3. Given a market structure (p, α, r, τ, χ) and ω′, ω′′ ∈ Ω with ω′′ < ω′, for
any given ICM architecture P (s, ω), it holds that P (s, ω′) first-order stochastic dominates
(FOSD) P (s, ω′′), or in other words, P (s, ω′)
FO
≻ P (s, ω′′)
Hence, there exists an unambiguous and positive relation between the number of loans
provided by a firm and her initial cash endowment ω. This is important because it implies
that pairwise exchange incentives are sufficiently strong to survive -at distribution level-
Assumption 8, where I let firms’ budget Kt′(t) to grow unbounded.
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3.3. Effect of Debt-to-Equity on Cross-Subsidization
A large empirical literature posits that ICMs exist due to a frictional problem. Several
papers provide evidence of a positive relation between looser internal debt-to-equity con-
strains and capital relocation, as measured in terms of density of financial ramifications
(see, for example, Lee et al., 2009 and Shi et al., 2019). I explore such nexus by assuming
a positive shock on the debt-to-equity regulations, allowing corporate leverage to change
from α1 to α2, α2 > α1. Such shocks bears two implications. First, the segmentation
structure obtained in Proposition 2 shifts on the right. To see this, consider the set of
fully (respectively, partially constrained) firms D∗ (respectively, D∗∗). Indeed, it holds
that D∗α2 ⊂ D
∗
α1 ⊂ D and ω
∗
1 ≡ ω∗∗/(1 + α1) > ω∗2 ≡ ω∗∗/(1 + α2). From Proposition 2
capital demand is a concave function of α, thus the shift leads to an aggregate increase
on the demand side of the ICM.
Second, the laxer regulation α also effects the other side of the market. Albeit the
quantity supplied by type ω ∈ S is unaffected (as determined by ω∗∗p,r), there are two
orders of effects to consider on Ω: (i) the interval of fully-constrained borrower types D∗
shrinks and, as a result, there is more residual capital available in the market that can be
freed for lending via to the trickle-down mechanism. (ii) From the lenders’ perspective,
the average attractiveness of a loan as defined in ϕr,τ,χ,α,ω∗∗ changes, thus affecting the
overall interconnectedness of the ICM. I verify that looser regulations α expands inter-firm
lending. To do so, I verify the following conditions: (1) Lenders’ profits are increasing
in the number of loans s they provide on the market. (ii) The number of loans agreed
in the system increases with α raising. While the first observation follows directly from
pairwise efficiency of exchanges, the second one requires to prove that there exists an
unambiguous and positive relation between the ICM structure P (s, ω) and α. To do so,
I first isolate a monotonic and positive relationship between ϕr,τ,χ,α,ω∗∗ and α. Secondly,
I use the criterion of FOSD to order the efficiency of ICMs characterized by different
debt-to-equity regulations. Hence,
Proposition 4. (i) Given a market structure and a lending policy ωe, it holds that ICM
profitability is bounded between zero and the average profit that a non-fully constrained
borrower can make out of her loans by direct production, that is












(ii) The average profitability of the ICM ϕr,τ,χ,α,ω∗∗ is increasing and non-negative in
α ≥ 0.
From Proposition 4 profitability is negatively affected by regulations via loss of pro-
duction revenue due to the reduced capability of firms to obtain capital from the internal
market. Because ϕr,τ,χ,α,ω∗∗ measures the potential gains of a transaction - regardless to
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the benefiting party - a reduction of ϕr,τ,χ,α,ω∗∗ decreases the ICM internal welfare. Next,
I use again the concept of FOSD29 to show that
Proposition 5. Given two ICM architectures P (s, ω;α) and P ′(s, ω;α′) as defined in
Theorem 1 with α ≥ α′, then it holds that P (s, ω;α) first-order stochastic dominates
(FOSD) P (s, ω;α′), or in other words, P (s, ω;α)
FO
≻ P (s, ω;α′),∀ω ∈ Ω.
In other words, debt-to-equity regulations affect unambiguously the density of the ICM
via ϕr,τ,χ,α,ω∗∗ . In particular, higher debt-to-equity induces higher cross-subsidization.
This monotonic result reasons well with the unanimous empirical evidence mentioned
above.











Figure 4: The effect on the demand for inter-firm loans Dω of an exogenous increase of the
market price p from p1 to p2, p2 > p1 for given α. The increment translates in a rightward shift
of both ω∗∗p,r and ω∗ ≡ ω∗∗p,r/(1 + α), respectively from ω∗1 to ω∗2 and from ω∗∗1 to ω∗∗2 .
The second dimension shaping the ICM Structure is the good market. A common
tenet of the empirical literature on the bright sides of ICM emphasizes the reactivity of
ICMs to market shocks (Buchuk et al., 2014). For example, Khanna and Tice (2001)
show30 that capital allocation within ICMs is highly sensitive to the profitability of local
markets, with PUs quickly transferring resources out of deteriorating markets toward
growing ones. I explore such channel by letting p shift from p1 to p2, p2 > p1, reflecting
an increased profitability of the production market. From (1) and (2) it follows that
ω∗∗2 ≡ ω∗∗p1,r ≥ ω
∗∗
1 ≡ ω∗∗p1,r (see also Figure 4). Hence - given the number of firms in the
29Differently from other works (see Jackson and Rogers (2007)) in which FOSD is assessed for a uni-
variate network distribution P (s), I show that FOSD does hold also in a bivariate case such the one I
presented with P (s, ω). Given two bivariate distribution P (s, ω) and P ′(s, ω), I say that P (s, ω) first
order stochastically dominates P ′(s, ω) if P (s, ω) ≤ P ′(s, ω) ∀s > 0, ω ∈ Ω.
30I refer the reader to the literature in Khanna and Tice (2001), Khanna and Palepu (2000) and
Buchuk et al. (2014) for a comprehensive set of examples.
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Two contrasting effects are potentially in place. A positive shock on attractiveness
increases the pressure over capital supply but also shrinks the amount of pure lenders ω ∈
S in the system. Hence, I first establish a relation between welfare and ICM connectedness
by ordering through FOSD the different geometries induced by changes in ω∗∗p,r. In the
following I characterize the behavior of ϕr,τ,χ,α,ω∗∗ with respect to a change in ω∗∗p,r
Proposition 6. For α ≥ 0 , the average profitability of a loan ϕr,τ,χ,α,ω∗∗ is bounded below
by 0 and is strictly increasing in ω∗∗p,r.
The above leads to a clear-cut ordering between cross-subsidization and the production
market profitability
Proposition 7. Given two ICM architectures P (s, ω; p1) and P ′(s, ω; p2) as defined in
Theorem 1 with p2 ≥ p1, it holds that P (s, ω; p2)
FO
≻ P ′(s, ω; p1)
The finding in Proposition 7 is indeed supportive of the transfer mechanism described in
literature on the bright side of ICMs mentioned at the beginning of the Section, where
ICM reacts to better (respectively, worse) market opportunities by increasing (respec-
tively, reducing) inter-firm cross-subsidization.
3.5. The Interplay Between Internal and External Financing
Lastly31, I address the nodal issue of the interaction between internal and external finance
by studying the effect of changes to the cost of money market τ and bank rate r. From
Proposition 1, a shock on either channel can be decoupled in two dimensions. First, a
common shock in the flat-base loan Ap,r,τ symmetrically affects any type e ∈ {0, ..., ē}. At
the same time, the bank adjusts the type-specific component of the lending policy given
by the type-based discrimination Br,τ,χ. Hence, at firm level, the net effect on credit
availability is type-specific. In principle, At ICM level, the uneven response of bank
credit rationing can bear two effects, depending on the shock: first, it may lead to a shift
in the concentration of the mass of loans toward higher or lower types. Second, it may
contribute in rarefying (respectively, densifying) the overall ICM structure. In addition to
these effect, a shock on the bank rate r may alter the exchange and borrowing incentives
via a change in the profitability of the production market.
31I thank an anonymous referee for critical suggestions that led to the results of this section.
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3.5.1. Shocks to Money Markets
Suppose that the money market rate grows from τ1 to τ2, with τ2 > τ1. From Proposi-
tion 1, this affects the bank’s optimal lending policy in (5) by depressing the flat-base
loan Ap,r,τ and increasing the type-based discrimination Br,τ,χ. Two effects are in place.
First, the hike alters the segmentation of endowments e. To see this, let e1(τ) (respec-
tively, e2(τ)) be the type obtaining a credit line corresponding to ωe1(τ) = ω∗∗/(1 + α)
(respectively, ωe2(τ) = ω∗∗) from the bank’s problem in (5) and define E1 ≡ {0, ..., e1},
E2 ≡ {e1, ..., e2} and ES ≡ {e2, ..., ē}. From Proposition 2, for any generic endowment
e ∈ E1 (respectively, e ∈ E2) or e ∈ ES, it holds that ωe ∈ D∗ (respectively, ωe ∈ D∗∗) or
ωe ∈ S. Clearly, a shock on τ may affect the relative sizes of sets E1, E2 and ES. Second,
from the discussion in Section 2.4, all types e < êp,r (respectively, e > êp,r ) experience a
net credit cut (respectively, expansion). Hence, the reshuffling of types and their lending
profile will depend on the intensity of the shock as well as the position of êp,r relative to
e1(τ1) and e2(τ1).
Two cases are critical32. (i) êp,r ≤ e1(τ1) < e2(τ1). Here, the risk profile of the
investment is moderate relative to firms’ endowment (see (3)). The bank expands the
credit lines to at least one type e ∈ E1 and to any type e ∈ E2 and e ∈ ES. Therefore,
e1(τ2) ≤ e1(τ1) and e2(τ2) ≤ e2(τ1). As firms in E1 are fully constrained, demand for
internal credit by any type e < êp,r is invariant to higher bank discrimination. As a
result of at least one type e switching from E1 to E2, the demand for ICM credit shrinks.
(ii) e1(τ1) < e2(τ1) < êp,r. In this case, e1(τ2) ≥ e1(τ1) and e2(τ2) ≥ e2(τ1). The net
effect on the demand for internal credit depends on the magnitude of the debt-to-equity
ratio α and the hike τ2 relative to the endowment segmentation as induced by τ1. A
shock τ2 > τ1 has two opposite effects: one the one hand, it will expand the size of sets
E1 and E2 relative to ES. On the other hand, given the debt-to-equity regulations α,
a shock depressing bank credit bears two implications related to the fact that internal
borrowing depends on bank credit ωe. First, it tightens the cap on the maximum amount
of internal debt of fully-constrained types in E1. Second, as the bank loan is proportional
to the endowment type e, higher types switching from ES to E2 will ask for less ICM
credit relative to smaller types. When debt-to-equity regulations are sufficiently tight,
the inflow of high types in the pool of E2 borrowers may fail to compensate the smaller
demand from fully-constrained firms in E1. The net effect of shocks on τ on the demand
for ICM credit is therefore ambiguous. The coexistence of these cases implies that there
is no monotonic relationship between τ and the market average profitability ϕr,τ,χ,α,ω∗∗
in (16) in general. Therefore, as the market profitability drives market formation, the
response of ICM structure is not monotonic in general to shocks to τ > 0. This is
32The full taxonomy is analyzed in the proof of Proposition 8.
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formalized in the following
Proposition 8. Given two ICM architectures P (s, ω; τ1) and P ′(s, ω; τ2) as defined in
Theorem 1 with τ1 ̸= τ2, it is not possible in general to order P (s, ω; τ1) and P ′(s, ω; τ2)
by means of FOSD.
The result is consistent with the ambivalent evidence on the changes to cross-subsidization
following a credit crunch. For example, Lee et al. (2009) show that bank credit and
cross-subsidization become marginal in determining PUs’ investment levels following a
tightening to the debt-to-equity ratio and tighter bank regulations. On the other hand,
Khanna and Tice (2001) provide abundant evidence on a positive relationship between
ICM cross-subsidization and tightening of the external capital markets.
3.5.2. Shocks to Bank Rates
With no loss of generality, suppose r2 > r1. Relative to the previous channel, as rates
are competitive, a shock on r bears the additional implication of worsened profitability
of production markets33 (see Proposition 2). Two cases can emerge, depending on the
bank’s relative cost of liquidity θ. First, when the cost is sufficiently small, θ < 1/2,
the bank’s behavior depends on the riskiness of the investment (see Section 2.4). If
the investment risk is high enough (i.e., p > p̄θ), a hike r2 > r1 implies that the risk
neutral bank maximizes expected profits with less outstanding credit. Therefore, the
bank cuts credit lines to all endowment types on the support. Since internal borrowing
depends on bank credit, less bank credit implies a tighter cap on the maximum amount
of internal debt. In this scenario, the joint effect of reduced market profitability and
tighter bank credit rarefies the ICM structure. Second, if investment risk is sufficiently
moderate or the relative cost of liquidity θ is high enough, θ > 1/2, the risk neutral
bank can decide to selectively expand (respectively, cut) credit provision to a fraction
of high-gain (respectively low-gain) types, e < e∗p,r,τ (respectively, e∗p,r,τ ). In this latter
case, for reasons similar to the ones extensively discussed for shocks to the money market
channel, it is not possible in general to establish an ordering (in terms of FOSD) between
different ICM architectures, or in other words, it is unclear ex-ante what is the effect on
cross-subsidization of a shock on lending rate r. This is formalized in the following
Proposition 9. Consider two ICM architectures P (s, ω; r1) and P ′(s, ω; r2) as defined
in Theorem 1 with r2 > r1. Let θ and p̄θ be as defined in Proposition 1. Then,
1. For θ < 1/2 and p > p̄θ, it holds that P (s, ω; r1)
FO
≻ P ′(s, ω; r2).
2. For all other cases, it is not possible in general to order P (s, ω; r1) and P ′(s, ω; r2)
33For example, in discussing the effects on Korean firms of interest rate hikes during the Korean Crisis,
Borensztein and Lee (2002) find that real money and credit slowed down during the crisis, yet, it is not
clear on how significantly domestic credit conditions tightened, as both credit supply and demand felt
simultaneously.
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Figure 5: Equilibrium number of outstanding loans per type, E [s|ω] given the market structure
(p, α, r, τ, χ) = (50, 0.5, 1.01, 0.5, 0.99), endowment structure e ∈ {0, ..., 100} and production
function f(·) = log(·). The red line (respectively, the circles) represents the expected number
of outstanding loans, E [s |ω] as derived from the mean-field approximation (20) (respectively,
the simulation as per Section 4.1).
by means of FOSD.
Therefore, the effect of bank rate r on the internal lending structure critically depends
on the bank’s relative cost of liquidity. In particular, when such cost is low enough, a
reduction of bank rates triggers an aggressive credit expansion as well as a higher demand
for debt motivated by an improvement of good markets. These two effects are jointly
responsible for an unambiguous densification of ICM. Proposition 9 matches well with
empirical evidence. For example, using a very granular inter-firm lending data set, Shi et
al. (2019) find that a localized 16.6% bank credit expansion within a booming economy
can migrate through the ICM and boost PUs’ investment by 1%. On the other hand,
Proposition 9 also shows that the above case is a knife-edge situation within a more
complex taxonomy.
4. Quantitative Assessment
4.1. Set-Up and Diagnostics
The analytical results presented in Section 3 rest on three technical assumptions. These
enable an explicit characterization of the exchange probability ξ(·) (see Section 4) and
the study of the ensuing dynamics. In this Section I validate the mean-field analysis by
comparing a simulated market formation process against its analytical counterpart as
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derived in Theorem 1. In both simulations and mean-field analysis I assume a common
market structure given by M = (p, α, r, τ, χ) = (50, 0.5, 1.01, 0.5, 0.99), together with an
endowment structure ē = 100 and production function f(·) = log(·). The simulated
market formation process adheres to the protocol described in Section 2.1 and in Figure
1. I generate an initial ICM made of N0 = {1, 2, .., 50} PUs with random endowment
uniformly distributed across {0, ..., 100}. Then, I let the economy grow for t = 1, 2, ..., t̄
periods, with one newcomer accessing the market in every period. I fix the size of the
loan to ℓ = 1. For each successful transaction, I update the vector of cash endowments




in which each element Kω′(t̄) is defined as Kω′(t̄) ≡ (1/t̄)
∑t̄
i=1 1ωi=ω′Ki(t̄),
where 1(·) is the indicator function taking value 1 when the condition in parentheses is
matched and zero otherwise. Therefore, Kω′(t̄) contains the average number of outstand-






across M = 500 simulations. In Figure 5 I report the standard-
ized average number of loans s per type ω, both for Simulations and mean-field analysis
(Theorem 1). As it stands from the graph, the mean-field analysis provides a very good
qualitative approximation of the lending structure as observed in the simulated market.
4.2. Comparative Statics: The Effect of Shocks on Equilibrium ICM
In the following, I use the mean-field derivation of the ICM architecture (Theorem 1)
to explore the quantitative implications of shocks to the channels analyzed in Sections
3.3-3.5. Unless otherwise stated, the set-up corresponds to the one adopted in Section
4.1.
4.2.1. Shocks to Debt-to-Equity Regulations
In this section I explore the effects of shocks to the debt-to-equity regulation on the equi-
librium ICM architecture. Everything else fixed, four debt-to-equity configurations are
considered, α ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1}. The results are collected in Figure 6. In the figure,
in each row, the central (respectively, right) column depicts the equilibrium bank lend-
ing policy ωe (respectively, the equilibrium cash holdings Kω) for any type e ∈ {0, ..., ē}
(respectively, ω ∈ Ω). The left column contains the heat-maps of the densities of the
equilibrium ICM architectures p(s, ω;α) as defined in (20), in which a darker (respec-
tively, lighter) color captures smaller (respectively, higher) density. The loosening of α
from α = 0.25 to α = 1 ( corresponding to reading Figure 6 from top to bottom) leads
to three main observations. First, the bank’s equilibrium lending policy (central column)
is not impacted by a shock on α. Second, while the size of the set of non-borrowers S
is fixed across shocks, the size of fully (respectively, partially) constrained firms shrinks
(respectively, expands), coherently with Proposition 5. Third, by observing the compar-
31
ative statics of the equilibrium ICM architecture across shocks, we confirm that better
debt-to-equity regulations lead to an unambiguous densification of cross-subsidization for
all types ω ∈ Ω.
4.2.2. Shocks to Market Price
I modify the exercise of 4.2.1 by considering four alternative price configurations, p ∈
{50, 50.5, 51, 51.5}, everything else fixed. The exercise is reported in Figure 7. Similar to
a shock on debt-to-equity rate α, an improvement in the profitability of the good market,
reflected in price p increasing from p = 50 to p = 51.5 (corresponding to reading Figure 7
from top to bottom) does not affect the bank’s lending policy (so that the curves in the
central column of Figure 7 are fixed) and unambiguously densifies the ICM architecture
across all types ω ∈ Ω, as predicted by Proposition 7. However, differently from a shock to
debt-to-equity regulations, a change in price reduces the size of the set of non-constrained
types ω ∈ S relative to the set of fully and partially constrained agents, respectively given
by ω ∈ D∗ and ω ∈ D∗∗. This translates in a shorter length of the top segment in the
distribution of cash holdings Kω, corresponding to Kω, ω ∈ S.
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Figure 6: From top to bottom: the effect of increasing the internal debt-to-equity ratio α for
α ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1}, given market structure (p, r, τ, χ) = (50, 1.01, 0.5, 0.99) and ē = 100 and
f(·) = log(·). (Left.) Heat-maps of the equilibrium class p(s, ω; α) as defined in (20), in which
darker (respectively, lighter) colors capture smaller (respectively, higher) density (Center.) The
equilibrium lending policy ωe. (Right.) The equilibrium cash holdings Kω as a function of
e ∈ {0, ..., ē}. The loosening of α from α = 0.25 to α = 1 has three effects. First, the bank’s
equilibrium lending policy (central column) is not impacted by a shock on α. Second, while the
size of the set of non-borrowers S is fixed across shocks, the size of fully (respectively, partially)
constrained firms shrinks (respectively, expands), coherently with Proposition 5. Third, by
observing the comparative statics of the equilibrium ICM architecture across shocks (left col-
umn), we confirm that better debt-to-equity regulations lead to an unambiguous densification
of cross-subsidization for all types ω ∈ Ω.
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Effect of Increment on Market Price p










Figure 7: From top to bottom: the effect of increasing the price in the final good market p with
p ∈ {50, 50.5, 51, 51.2}, given market structure (α, r, τ, χ) = (0.5, 1.01, 0.5, 0.99) and ē = 100 and
f(·) = log(·). (Left.) Heat-map of the equilibrium class p(s, ω; p) as defined in (20), in which
darker (respectively, lighter) colors capture smaller (respectively, higher) density (Center.) The
equilibrium lending policy ωe. (Right.) The equilibrium cash holdings Kω as a function of
e ∈ {0, ..., ē}. Better market profitability, as reflected by price p increasing from p = 50 to
p = 51.5 does not affect the bank’s lending policy (so that the curves in the central column
are fixed) and unambiguously densifies the ICM architecture across all types ω ∈ Ω. However,
differently from a shock to debt-to-equity regulations, a change in price reduces the size of the
set of non-constrained types ω ∈ S relative to the set of fully and partially constrained agents,
respectively given by ω ∈ D∗ and ω ∈ D∗∗. This translates in a shorter length of the top
segment in the distribution of cash holdings Kω, corresponding to Kω, ω ∈ S.
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Effect of Increment of money-market cost 














Figure 8: From top to bottom: the effect of increasing the cost of money market τ with
τ ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1}, given market structure (p, α, r, χ) = (50, 0.5, 1.01, 0.99) and ē = 100 and
f(·) = log(·). (Left.) Heat-map of the equilibrium class p(s, ω; p) as defined in (20), in which
darker (respectively, lighter) colors capture smaller (respectively, higher) density (Center.) The
equilibrium lending policy ωe. (Right.) The equilibrium cash holdings Kω as a function of
e ∈ {0, ..., ē}. With this parametrization, e1 < e2 < ē < êp,r (see Case (ii) as described in
Section 3.5). As money market cost increases, the bank’s lending policy ωe (central column)
tightens for any type e ∈ {0, ..., ē}, with lower types being proportionally more affected than
higher types. Consequently, the distribution of cash holdings Kω adjusts to the credit-crunch
with a leftward shift, as a tighter lending policy translates into the creation of new lending
profiles ωe. Lastly, by comparing the densities of the ICM architectures (left column), it is clear
that there is no monotonic relationship between the intensity of internal lending and and credit



























Figure 9: The effect of increasing the cost of money market τ , with τ ∈ {0.1, ..., 1.0}, given
market structure (p, α, r, χ) = (50, 0.3, 1.01, 0.99) and ē = 200 and f(·) = log(·). (Left.) Average
number of internal loans per type ω, E [s| ω], for three cost configurations τ ∈ {0.2, 0.5, 0.8},
respectively given by the dashed blue, dotted red and solid yellow lines. These lines are not
monotonic in τ , hence P (ω, s; τ) violate FOSD. (Right.) Total number of ICM loans E [s] for
τ ∈ {0.1, ..., 1}. Again, the violation of FOSD is sufficiently strong to generate a non-monotonic
relationship between cost τ and the total number of outstanding loans.
4.2.3. Shocks to Money-Market Cost
In this section I perform two exercises. First, I conduct a mean-field analysis of the
effect of shocks on money market cost τ on the model’s equilibrium quantities. The
following four cost configurations are considered, τ ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1}, everything else
fixed as per the set-up of Section 4.1. The results are reported in Figure 8. Notice that
for the selected parametrization, it is easy to show that e1 < e2 < ē < êp,r. Hence, the
example falls within case (ii) described in Section 3.5.1. I make the following observations.
First, as money market cost increases (corresponding to reading the Figure from top to
bottom) the bank’s lending policy ωe (central column of Figure 8) tightens for any type
e ∈ {0, ..., ē}, with lower types being proportionally more affected than higher types34.
Second, the distribution of cash holdings Kω adjusts to the credit-crunch with a leftward
shift, as a tighter lending policy translates into the creation of new lending profiles ωe.
In other words, given τ and τ ′, with τ ′ > τ and e = 0, ω0(τ ′) < ω0(τ). Second, by
comparing the densities of the ICM architectures (left column), it is clear that there
34More precisely, the bank lending policy ωe pivots around the pivotal type êp,r.
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is no monotonic relationship between the intensity of internal lending and and credit
tightening, thus validating the co-existence of the two tensions discussed in the previous
paragraph.
Lastly, to inspect more in detail the lack of monotonic relationship discussed above and
in Proposition 8, I plot the average number of loans for various configurations of cost τ .
This is done in Figure 9. On the Left pane, I plot the average number of internal loans
per type ω, E [s| ω], for three cost configurations τ ∈ {0.2, 0.5, 0.8}, respectively given by
the dashed blue, dotted red and solid yellow lines. A necessary condition for FOSD to
hold is that these lines are monotonic in τ . However, this is indeed not the case, as the
curve referred to τ = 0.2 sits in between the other two curves. On the Right pane I plot
the total number of ICM loans E [s] for τ ∈ {0.1, ..., 1.0}. Here, the violation of FOSD,
as originated by the two tensions described above, is sufficiently strong to generate a
non-monotonic relationship between cost τ and the total number of outstanding loans in
the ICM.
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Effect of Increment of Bank Lending Rate r
Figure 10: From top to bottom: the effect of increasing the bank rate r with r ∈
{2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4}, given market structure (p, α, τ, χ) = (50, 0.5, 0.5, 0.99) and ē = 100 and
f(·) = log(·). (Left.) Heat-map of the equilibrium class p(s, ω; r) as defined in (20), in which
darker (respectively, lighter) colors capture smaller (respectively, higher) density (Center.) The
equilibrium lending policy ωe. (Right.) The equilibrium cash holdings Kω as a function of
e ∈ {0, ..., ē}. With this parametrization, θ < 0.5 (see Proposition 9). As rates increase, the
bank’s lending policy ωe (central column) tightens for any type e ∈ {0, ..., ē}. Hence, the distri-
bution of cash holdings Kω (Right column) adjusts to the credit-crunch with a small leftward
shift (similarly to a hike in τ , see Figure 8). However, as an increment in r is also reflective of a
loss of profitability in the production market, the set of pure lenders S expands relative to the
other two sets. The result of these two counter-balancing forces shows a prevalence of the real
driver, as ICM architectures (depicted in Left column) progressively rarefy. Therefore, it holds
the FOSD ordering identified in Proposition 9 for θ < 0.5.
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Figure 11: The effect of increasing bank rates r on the total expected number of loans E [s],
for two alternative configurations such that θ > 0.5 (Left Pane) or θ < 0.5 (Right Pane), given
market structure (p, α, θ, χ) = (100, 0.3, 0.5, 0.99) and ē = 200 and f(·) = log(·). Clearly, FOSD
does not apply with certainty only in the configurations such that θ > 0.5 (Left pane).
4.2.4. Shock to Bank Lending Rate
Lastly, I study the mean-field effect on the model’s equilibrium quantities of shocks to
interest rates. I perform two exercises. First, I compute the model’s equilibrium quantities
for four configurations r ∈ {2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4} given the set-up described in Section 4.1.
The results are reported in Figure 10. Notice that for this parametrization, it holds that
θ < 0.5, therefore we predict FOSD applies between ICM structures (see Proposition
9). I make three observations. First, as rates increase (corresponding to reading the
Figure from top to bottom) the bank’s lending policy ωe (central column of Figure 10)
tightens for any type e ∈ {0, ..., ē}. Second, the distribution of cash holdings Kω adjusts
to the credit-crunch with a small leftward shift (similarly to a hike in τ). However, as
an increment in r is also reflective of a loss of profitability in the production market,
the set of pure lenders S expands relative to the other two sets. Third, by comparing
the densities of the ICM architectures (left column), the FOSD ordering identified in
Proposition 9 for θ < 0.5 is evident: as rates grow, all types reduce lending.
Second, I validate the role of θ in light of Proposition 9 by plotting the total expected
number of loans E [s] for various configurations of rate r and p > p̄θ. This is done in
Figure 11, where, on the Left pane (respectively, Right pane), I test an array of rates r
such that θ < 0.5 (respectively, θ > 0.5). As it stands clear from the graph, FOSD does
not apply with certainty only in the configurations such that θ < 0.5.
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Figure 12: The effect on total expected outstanding loans E [s] of the shock structure described
in Section 4.3. The initial market structure corresponds to M1 = (50, 4, 0.175, 0.125, 0.9). (Left
Pane) The shock structure is linearly shifted from M1 to M10 = (46.5, 2, 0.375, 0.35, 0.8). The
compounded effect of the shocks is negative for a sufficiently high magnitude. (Right Pane)
Three major shocks are considered and individually increased keeping all other shocks fixed:
the change of market profitability p, the joint effect of a change in money market funds τ
and overnight lending r and the debt-to-equity regulations α. When shocks are individually
applied on the ICM in isolation, the tightening of the financial market affects the ICM structure
differently from the debt-to-equity and market profitability channels. The tightening of the
financial market, taken in isolation from other shocks, increases the density of the ICM structure,
reflecting the functioning of the credit-reallocation channel. At the same time, the magnitude
of such effect is not sufficiently strong to overcome the reduction in density as caused by the
two alternative channels.
4.3. Matching the Stylized Facts of the Korean Crisis
To conclude, I develop a simple exercise to show a possible route of application of the
analytical framework developed in this paper. I consider some of the main qualitative
features of the so called “Korean crisis”. This has been a rapid economic downturn
hitting the Korean economy in 1997-1998 as a consequence of the 1997 Asian Financial
crisis35. I explore the effect on the ICM structure P (s, ω) derived in Theorem 1 of a
set of intertwined shocks. I argue that the model can be instrumental in disentangling
the contribution of each channel to the aggregate shock, which I measure in terms of
variations to the density of the ICM.
Calibration. I focus the analysis on the following empirical facts (see Borensztein and
35For a comprehensive description of the crisis, I direct the reader to Almeida et al. (2015) and the
literature therein cited.
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Lee, 2002, Lee et al., 2009, Almeida et al., 2015 and Lim (2012)). First, the year-on-year
rate of growth of real sales for the average firm dropped from 4.3% in 1997 to −6.8% in the
first half of 1998. Second, the overnight call rate soared from 12.5% to 32% at the peak of
the crisis. On the other hand, for a comparable period, overdraft lending rate increased
from 17.1% to 37.5%. Third, following the crisis, BGs firms were required to drastically
reduce their debt-to-equity ratios from an average of 400% to a maximum of 200%. Forth,
at the peak of the crisis, the percentage of defaulted commercial bills jumped from about
10% to 20%. To obtain sufficient heterogeneity at PUs level, I will hold that firms are
uniformly distributed on the interval e ∈ {0, ..., 100}. This simple structure36 retains
enough heterogeneity at endowment level, yet it is simple enough to enable a focus on
the remaining channels of heterogeneity. I discretionary set profitability of the production
market p before the crisis to 50% of the highest endowment37 ē. Lastly, with no loss of
generality, I set the loan size to ℓ = 1. Let MT ≡ (p, α, r, τ, χ) be the market structure
of the economy in month T , with T = 1 and T = 10 respectively coinciding with the
beginning and the end of the crisis. Using the empirical facts above, I impose as starting
vector M1 = (50, 4, 0.175, 0.125, 0.9) and as end vector M10 = (46.5, 2, 0.375, 0.35, 0.8).
Each element of the vector MT , T = 2, ..., 9 is obtained by imposing a linear uniform
shock variation to the corresponding element in vector MT −1. For each month T , I use
the market structure MT to compute the associated analytical ICM architecture PT (s, ω)
as derived in (19) (Theorem 1), and use the latter to obtain the total expected outstanding
loans in month T , ET [s], that is our proxy for studying the density of ICM.
Results. The empirical literature identified two important regularities in the aftermath
of the crisis. First, the overall level of cross-subsidization in ICMs has substantially
rarefied (Lee et al., 2009). Secondly, a credit crunch limited the availability of credit to
firms (Lim, 2012), however, it is not clear on how significantly domestic credit conditions
tightened: as both credit supply and demand felt simultaneously in the crisis period, it
is not clear whether credit supply was really a binding constraint (Borensztein and Lee,
2002). In Figure 12, I report the results of two exercises. On the Left Pane, I show
the cumulative effect on total monthly expected outstanding loans, ET [s], of all shocks
discussed above. On the Right pane, I report the individual contribution of three major
shock channels. In this exercise, I individually vary each channel by taking all other
shock sources fixed. These channels are: the change of market profitability p, the joint
effect of a change in money market funds τ and overnight lending r and the debt-to-
equity regulations α. In terms of aggregate effects, it is clear that the compounded effect
36It is indeed possible to construct a more refined endowment distribution using, for example, the
Korea Listed Companies Association Data-set (see, for instance, Lim, 2012).
37In untabled simulations I try alternative starting values with no effect on the qualitative results
presented here.
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of the shocks is negative, and as such the structure rarefies as shocks jointly intensify.
However, when shocks are individually applied on the ICM in isolation, it is interesting
to notice that the tightening of the financial market affects the ICM structure differently
from the debt-to-equity and market profitability channels. In particular, I find that the
tightening of the financial market, taken in isolation from other shocks, would contribute
to an increased densification of the ICM structure, reflecting the functioning of the credit-
reallocation channel described by Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006) and Khanna and Tice
(2001). At the same time, the magnitude of such effect is not sufficiently strong to
overcome the reduction in densification as caused by the two alternative channels, that
is profitability of markets and debt-to-equity ratio. This latter result is coherent with
the literature that attributed Korean credit crunch to the joint effect of banks’ "flight
to credit quality" (Borensztein and Lee, 2002) and tightening of internal debt-to-equity
regulations (Lee et al., 2009, Lim (2012)).
5. Conclusion
In this paper I presented a model in which an internal capital market emerges from three
leading drivers: production incentives, debt-to-equity ratio and bank credit rationing.
The formation mechanism delivers neat predictions with respect to the long-term impli-
cations on the structure of the intensity of cross-subsidization between firms and provide
guidance on how to study the effect of complex shocks on internal capital markets.
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Appendix A. Neutrality of PU’s Budget Balance
The comparative statics results in Section 3 rest on loan distribution P (s, ω) obtained
under the assumption of unconstrained budget law of motions, that is Kt′(t) is poten-
tially allowed to become negative. Here I explore a possible way to reintroduce budget
constraints in the analysis and show that these do not affect one of the main results of
the main model. Given a type ωt′ , from (14) I define
ℓs̃t′ = ωt′ +Dt′ , (A.1)
where s̃t′ is the upper bound to the number of loans that an agent endowed with ωt′ can
offer on the market. Now, I introduce the constrained distribution P̃ (s, ω) as follows:




for s ≤ s̃
0 otherwise
. (A.2)
By restricting the number of loans which t′ may offer on the market, the budget constraint
induces a truncation on P (s, ω). I show that the properties related to FOSD depicted for
example in Proposition 5 and 7 are preserved under any truncation, that is regardless to
the limited liability constraint38. With no loss of generality, I prove the equivalence by
assuming a loosening of the financial regulations from α′ to α, α′ < α.
Proposition 10. Given two CDF P̃ (s, ω;α) and P̃ ′(s, ω;α′) respectively obtained as the
truncation of P (s, ω;α) and P ′(s, ω;α′) as defined in (A.1), with α ≥ α′,
P (s, ω;α)
FO
≻ P ′(s, ω;α′) ⇔ P̃ (s, ω;α)
FO
≻ P̃ ′(s, ω;α′)
That is the FOSD ordering holds irrespectively of the lender’s budget constraint binding.
Appendix B. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. (i) Given a generic endowment type e, from differentiation of
the three components of (4) I obtain:
e2χ(1 + r)
pf(ω∗∗) − e
+ e(1 + r)(pf(ω





− (1 + τ)e = 0.
The expression follows from algebraic manipulation. The second order condition de-
38Hence, I adopt a conditional FOSD, which is a stronger ordering with respect to FOSD. Indeed it is







from which I prove the second part of the statement. From the result, it stands clear
that no lending is provided for τ > r. (ii) Now consider g∗e
g∗e · e =
pf(ω∗∗)(r − τ) + e(χ(1 + r) + (1 + τ))
2(1 + r)2
.
The result in the statement follows directly by taking the derivative of the RhS with
respect to e and checking the condition for the sign reversal. (iii) By differentiating the





> 0 ⇒ e < e∗p,r,τ ≡
(1 + r)(r − τ)pf ′(ω∗∗) + pf(ω∗∗)(1 + 2τ − r)
χ(1 + r) + 2(1 + τ)
, (B.1)
which sets the bound as defined in the statement. Now, define
ητ (p, r) ≡ (1 + r)(r − τ)pf ′(ω∗∗) + pf(ω∗∗)(1 + 2τ − r),
and notice that ητ (p, r) is continuous with continuous derivatives; lim ηr→0 = lim ηr→∞ =
∞, and lim ηp→0 = ∞. Let θ ≡ (1 + τ)/(1 + r). Then, lim ηp→∞ = ∞ (respectively,
lim ηp→∞ = −∞) for θ > 1/2 (respectively, θ < 1/2). Hence, there exists p = p̄θ such
that the statement follows.
(iv) The result immediately follows from differentiating (5) relative to τ . (v) The result
follows by noticing that pω is a standard linear transformation of the uniform distribution
pe. The result follows from application of a classical result in probability theory (see for
instance Grimmett and Stirzaker, 2019).
■
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) Define D∗ ⊂ D such as the set of fully-constrained bor-
rowers (borrowers for which given α and ω∗∗p,r the constraint holds tightly) and con-
sider ω∗ ∈ D∗ : f(ω∗ + αω∗) = f(ω∗∗). Because f(·) is a bijection, this implies that
ω∗ = ω∗∗/(1 + α). The construction of Dω easily follows. (ii) The result follows from





















Which gives as a result the area of the triangle defined on [0, ω∗∗] with height αω∗ from
Figure 2, weighted by pω. (iii) The result is straightly assessed by checking first and
second derivative with respect to the arguments.
■
Proof of Theorem 1. The methodology of the proof follows Vega-Redondo (2007) but
the resulting distribution is bivariate. I study the long-run behavior of the agents’ linking
dynamics by adopting a continuum approximation of the number of loans d(t) issued by
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each lender at any time. Due to the continuum approximation, at most one update takes
place almost surely at every instant. Hence, instead of "tracking" the stochastic evolution
of lending for each specific lender t′, I assume that agents that are identical in terms of
endowments and issued loans on average update symmetrically, thus implying that ξt′






t ·m(ωt′)ℓ · st′(t)
which is separable: ∫




and has initial condition st′(t′) = 0, as I assumed that every agent (including pure


















which shows that older lenders have more contracts in place, albeit at a decreasing growth
rate in time. Therefore, the probability that at any given time period t the node entered
at t′ has a certain in-degree st′ is given by











Since the only dynamical variable affecting the evolution of s is the time itself (i.e. the
number of borrowers entering the market), I restate the condition in terms of time interval
|t− t′|






In order to get rid of the time-component, rewrite the above equation as the probability
for a firm to enter after t′. Because the probability for a firm to enter in the market after
any fixed period is approximately uniform (i.e. 1/t) for t → ∞, such probability is given
by










Which also corresponds to the probability that at t, t′ has issued s loans conditional
on her initial endowment ωt′ . The result in the main text follows by applying Bayes’ rule:
P (s, ω) = Pω ·P (s|ω), from which I obtain the stationary CDF in (19). By differentiating
P (s|ω) with respect to s I derive the related density given in (20). ■
Proof of Proposition 3. From the definition of FOSD, I need to show that
P (s, ω′′) ≥ P ′(s, ω′) s ≥ 0.
In order to show that the condition holds, I reformulate P (s, ω) such as P (s, ω) =
PωP (s|ω). From the definition of Pω in Proposition 1, I know that Pω′
FO
≻ Pω′′ to prove
the statement, it it suffices to show that also PωP (s|ω′)
FO
≻ PωP (s|ω′′). This translates in
requiring that ∂P (s, ω)
∂ω










In fact, due to decreasing returns to scale I know that f ′′(ω) < 0 and consequently
m′(ω) < 0
■
Proof of Proposition 4. In this proof, I assume with no loss of generality that r = τ
so that Ap,r,τ = 0. (i) Notice that for ℓ → 0 it holds that
ῑut′(ℓ|x, ω) =



















[pf (ω + Iω) − pf(ω) − rIω] · pωdω.
Now, I break the problem by using the endowment segmentation that splits fully con-
strained from non-fully constrained types∫ ω∗
0
[pf (ω + αω)] pωdω +
∫ ω∗∗
ω∗
[pf (ω∗∗)] pωdω −
∫ ω∗∗
0




where f(ω∗∗) is the optimal production target as defined in (1). I substitute ω∗ =


















which measures the average profitability of a loan for fully or partially constrained types
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of borrowers. Then. the proof is simply obtained by taking the limits over α










for α → ∞. (B.4)
(ii) In order to prove the second part of the Proposition, define Kω ≡ Iω + ω. Now, I







































































Now it is easy to show that (B.5) is non-negative for α ∈ R+. From the solution of the
producer’s problem (1), I know that the production level for the agents whose constraint











a condition which is always fulfilled due to DRS, for all types ω ∈ D. Thus, given the
bound in (i), ϕr,τ,χ,α,ω∗∗ is increasing in α.
■
Proof of Proposition 5. In the following, as 1/ēBr,τ,χ is invariant to changes in α, I
discard it. Adapting a result from Huang, Kira and Vertinsky (Theorem 4 in Huang et
al., 1978) to the current context, two conditions are required to be in place to prove the
proposition: (i) P (s, ω;α)
FO
≻ P (s, ω;α′). (ii) ∂P (s,ω,α
′)
∂ω
< 0 39 . In what follows, I prove
that are both satisfied. (i) From the definition of FOSD:







2ϕr,τ,χ,α′,ω∗∗ ≥ 0, ∀s > 0
39This implies a non-negative correlation between ω and s. Without such restriction, conditional
dominance may not imply joint dominance (see Levy and Paroush, 1974, p.615).
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First, notice that m(ω) is decreasing in α due to DRS. Further, from Proposition 4 I
know that ϕr,τ,χ,α,ω∗∗ is increasing in α, and because α > α′ the condition is satisfied. (ii)
proved in Proposition 3.
■
Proof of Proposition 6. I follow the rationale of Proposition 4. First, notice from






(pf(ω∗∗) + ω∗∗pf ′(ω∗∗) − ω∗∗r),
however, by recalling how I built the types’ segmentation from the producer’s problem,





(p · f(ω∗∗)), (B.6)
which is always positive.
■
Proof of Proposition 7. The proof is omitted as it follows as a consequence of Propo-
sition 6 and the method used in the proof of Proposition 5
■
Proof of Proposition 8. Consider two ICM architectures P (s, ω; τ1) and P (s, ω; τ2),
such that, everything else fixed, it holds that τ2 ̸= τ1. Define Ω (respectively, Ω′) such as
the equilibrium endowment of the former (respectively, latter) ICM architecture. From
Proposition 1, Ω ⊂ Ω′. Fixed one type ω = ω̂ ∈ Ω and s = ŝ > 0, a sufficient condition
for FOSD to be violated in general is that the function ψr,χ,α,ω∗∗(τ1, τ2) defined as
ψr,χ,α,ω∗∗(τ1, τ2) ≡ Pŝ,ω̂(τ1) − Pŝ,ω̂(τ2)













changes sign at least once for τ2 > τ1 > 0. This is achieved by showing that ψr,χ,α,ω∗∗ is








where I used the fact that inf Ω = Ap,r,τ to decompose pω and discard 1/ēBr,χ(τ). This
is possible40 as 1/ēBr,χ(τ) is always positive and monotonic in τ for ω ∈ Ω, with a
multiplicative effect on terms within parentheses of (B.2). Now, call e1(τ) (respectively,
e2(τ)) such as the type achieving ωe1(τ) = ω∗∗/(1+α) (respectively, ωe2(τ) = ω∗∗) from the
40In untabled results, I show that the introduction of 1/ēBr,χ(τ) makes the computation of (B.7) more
cumbersome without affecting the qualitative result of the proof.
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bank’s problem in (5). For convenience41 in the following I use the sum approximation
e1(τ)∑
e=0










I specify as ad-hoc production function f(·) = log(·) and rewrite
e1(τ)∑
e=0
(p log(Ap,r(τ) + eBr,χ(τ)) − p log(Ap,r(τ) + eBr,χ(τ))) +
e1(τ)∑
e=0




p log(Ap,r(τ) + eBr,χ(τ)),




p log(1 + α) −
e2(τ)∑
e=e1(τ)+1
p log(Ap,r(τ) + eBr,χ(τ)). (B.7)
Holding e1 and e2 fixed, the first sum in (B.7) grows linearly in τ . Relative to the second
sum, by differentiating both terms within log(·) it is immediate to see that the sum grows
(respectively, shrinks) in τ for e > êp,r (respectively, e ≤ êp,r), where êp,r ≡ p log(ω∗∗).
Hence, the net effect of a shock τ2 > τ1 is an equilibrium credit expansion (respectively,
restriction) for any PU i ∈ N such that ei ≥ êp,r (respectively, ei < êp,r). Overall, the
behavior of (B.7) (and, more in general of ϕr,χ,α,ω∗∗(τ)) falls within three cases. Consider
sets E1, E2 and ES as defined in the main text. (i) êp,r ≤ e1(τ1) < e2(τ1). In this case,
e1(τ2) ≤ e1(τ1) and e2(τ2) ≤ e2(τ1). Hence,
ψ̄(τ2) − ψ̄(τ1) < −
e2(τ2)∑
e=e1(τ2)+1
p(log(Ap,r(τ2) + eBr,χ(τ2)) − log(Ap,r(τ1) + eBr,χ(τ1))) < 0.
whereas all types e < e1 are invariant to stricter bank rationing, hence total demand
for ICM credit shrinks as a result of at least one type e ∈ E1 switching to E2. (ii)
e1(τ1) < e2(τ1) < êp,r. In this case, e1(τ2) > e1(τ1) and e2(τ2) > e2(τ1), and
ψ̄(τ2) − ψ̄(τ1) = (e1(τ2) − e1(τ1) · p log(1 + α) +
e1(τ2)∑
e=e1(τ1)+1




p log(Ap,r(τ2) + eBr,χ(τ2)) −
e2(τ1)∑
e=e1(τ1)+1
p log(Ap,r(τ1) + eBr,χ(τ1))
 ,
where the first (respectively, the second) line accounts for all types switching from E2 to
E1 (respectively, from ES to E2). Notice that for each type e′ switching from E2 to E1
41The sum notation is simply used to emphasize the effect of changes to the types’ structure as induced
by changes to e1(τ) and e2(τ) but it does not alter the qualitative structure and result of the proof.
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following τ2 > τ1 the first line positively compounds a linear and a log increment as the
support of the first sum expands. In the second line, for each shock τ2 > τ1, the support
of the first sum slides toward higher types, whereas the second sum is fixed. Therefore,
for α small enough, it is possible to find τ2 > τ̄ (respectively, τ2 < τ̄) such that the
second sum dominates (respectively, is dominated by) all other terms in the expression.
(iii) e1(τ1) < êp,r ≤ e2(τ1). Here, e1(τ2) ≥ e1(τ1) and e2(τ2) ≤ e2(τ1), and
ψ̄(τ2) − ψ̄(τ1) = (e1(τ2) − e1(τ1) · p log(1 + α) +
e1(τ2)∑
e=e1(τ1)+1




p log(Ap,r(τ2) + eBr,χ(τ2)) −
êp,r∑
e=e1(τ1)+1





p log(Ap,r(τ2) + eBr,χ(τ2)) −
e2(τ1)∑
e=êp,r+1
p log(Ap,r(τ1) + eBr,χ(τ1))
 ,
where again the first line is as in case (ii), the second (respectively, third) line accounts
for types in E2 experiencing a credit cut (respectively, expansion) following the hike. De-
pending on the specific bank policy and the position of êp,r, the forth sum may dominate
(respectively, be dominated by) all other terms in the expression. Hence, the sign of
ψr,χ,α,ω∗∗(τ2) −ψr,χ,α,ω∗∗(τ1) depends on the granular values of τ1 and τ2 given α. The co-
existence of cases (i)-(iii) guarantees that ψ̄r,χ,α,ω∗∗(τ) and ϕr,χ,α,ω∗∗(τ) are not monotonic








= (1 + r)(p(1 + χ) log(p/r) − −2ω̂(1 + r))
ē(1 + χ(1 + r) + τ)2
,
so that the above is sign-invariant in τ . To show that ψr,χ,α,ω∗∗(τ1, τ2) is generally non-
monotonic in (τ1−τ2), it then suffices to select ω̂ = p(1+χ) log(p/r)/2(1+r) to annihilate
the effect of (ω̂ − A)/ēB and the result of the Proposition follows immediately from the
fact that ψ̄r,χ,α,ω∗∗(τ) is non-monotonic.
■
Proof of Proposition 9. Let two ICM architectures P (s, ω; r1) and P (s, ω; r2) such
that, everything else fixed, r2 > r1. Set ω = ω̂ and define the function ψτ,χ,α(r1, r2) such
as
ψτ,χ,α(r1, r2) ≡ Pŝ,ω̂(r1) − Pŝ,ω̂(r2)













(1) Let r2 and r1, r2 > r1 such that θ < 1/2 and let p > p̄θ so that e∗p,r,τ < 0. From
Proposition 1.3 and (B.1), ωe(r) is decreasing in r. Indeed, r2 > r1 implies that lending
shrinks, ωe(r1) > ωe(r2) ∀e > 0. Furthermore, fixed a bank lending policy ωe, from
(B.6) ϕr,τ,χ,α(ω∗∗) is monotonic and growing in p/r, hence ϕτ,χ,α,ω∗∗(r) is monotonic and
decreasing in r for a fixed lending policy ωe. Therefore, when the banking policy varies
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as a result of the shock, the two effects compound and this guarantees that ϕτ,χ,α,ω∗∗(r)









∗∗(r)) + (r − τ)f ′(ω∗∗(r)))
2ēχ(1 + τ)
> 0.
Hence, it holds that ψτ,χ,α(r1, r2) > 0. (2) Consider the cases where conditions in (1) do
not hold. From Proposition 1.3 and (B.1), e∗p,r,τ > 0. Hence, one can easily show that
ψτ,χ,α(r1, r2) is non-monotonic in general by following the same procedure used in the
proof of Proposition 9.
■
Proof of Proposition 10. The structure of the proof follows the one of Proposition 5.
However, while condition (ii) is straightforwardly assessed, condition (i) deserves some
care. Given ωt′ = ω, I prove that
P̃ (s, ω;α)
FO
≻ P̃ ′(s, ω;α′) ∀s ≤ s̃(ω).




, where m′(·) ≥ m(·)
with strict inequality if ω ∈ {0, ω∗} and A′ ≥ A. Hence, I rephrase the conditional FOSD
above in the following
1 − e−As2
1 − e−As̃2
≤ 1 − e
−A′s2
1 − e−A′s̃2




≤ 1 − e
−As̃2
1 − e−A′s̃2
∀s ∈ [0, s̃(ω)] ,
where it is clear that both the ratios are positive and greater than unity. Hence, it suffices
to show that









2 − e−A′s2 ≥ e−As̃2 − e−A′s̃2 ,
which can be stated as
g(s) ≥ B̃,
where B̃ is a positive constant. Now, notice that g(s) is monotonic and g(s̃) = B̃. In
order to prove the proposition, it suffices to show that g(s) is decreasing over the support.







In fact, from the component in brackets I obtain that
log(A′) − log(A) ≤ s2(A′ − A′),
which is always the case for all the s in the support.
■
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